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Abstract
Economic theory traditionally explains choice under risk through the preferences of the
individual, yet many important economic decisions are made by groups. To increase our
understanding of the implications of group decisions and enrich our theories accordingly,
we need empirical and experimental evidence on groups. Although economists have con-
ducted controlled laboratory experiments on individual choice for many decades, only
recently have researchers begun to use the experimental method to study group deci-
sions under risk. This thesis contributes to the study of group decision making under
risk by providing a cross-disciplinary review of the growing literature on this topic, fol-
lowed by three experiments on risk-taking by groups. The ﬁrst experiment investigates
the role of communication and peer eﬀects, the second experiment investigates group
composition, and the ﬁnal experiment focuses on information sharing in groups.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Controlled laboratory experiments have taught economists a lot about individual deci-
sions under risk, but we know relatively little about the decisions of groups. Although
group decisions under risk were much studied in psychology experiments in the mid to
late 20th century, the diﬀerence in measurement techniques and procedures between
psychology and economics experiments, notwithstanding the convergence between psy-
chology and economics in recent decades, makes it hard to assess the importance of this
evidence to modern-day economics. Economists have therefore taken to designing their
own experiments on group decisions under risk, based on the tasks and procedures from
the experimental literature on individual decision making. This thesis presents three
such economics experiments on group inﬂuence and group decision making under risk,
each comprising a chapter with a separate research question. To set the stage, the ex-
perimental chapters are preceded by a literature review that outlines the contributions
of experiments to the study of group decisions.
In the literature review in chapter two, we organise the experimental evidence on group
decisions under risk around three prominent empirical questions: (i) Do groups take
more or less risk than individuals, (ii) Are groups more rational risk takers than indi-
viduals, and (iii) Does group interaction aﬀect individual decisions under risk? We ﬁnd
that, although measurements of risk-taking by groups and individuals often diﬀer in se-
quential, within-subject experimental designs, the larger body of experimental evidence
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suggests there is no general tendency for group risk-taking to diﬀer from individual
risk-taking. Experiments in which risk is represented by lotteries over real monetary
earnings mostly ﬁnd no diﬀerence in risk-taking by groups and individuals. There are
some experimental designs in which group risk-taking is persistently higher than that
of individuals, however, such as the investment task used in chapters three and four of
the thesis. Second, there is no evidence that groups are more rational risk takers, in
the sense of being less susceptible to decision making biases and violations of Expected
Utility Theory, than individuals. This ﬁnding might come as a surprise to some, as
groups have been documented to out-perform individuals in intellective decisions and
strategic games (Charness & Sutter, 2012). The evidence on decisions under risk, how-
ever, indicates that these diﬀerences in ability do not necessarily imply that the actions
of groups are more in keeping with Expected Utility Theory. Finally, there is ample
evidence that group interaction and making decisions in a group aﬀects subsequent
individual risk-taking. This ﬁnding has implications for economists’ perception of the
stability of risk preferences in social contexts.
Chapter three presents an experiment that compares risk-taking by groups not only to
isolated individuals, but also to individuals who can communicate (‘consult’) about the
task with two other subjects, just like group members. The investment task used for
this chapter was selected because prior studies with this design report that groups take
signiﬁcantly more risk than individuals, with evidence suggesting that this diﬀerence
is due to greater expected earnings maximisation by groups (Sutter, 2007, 2009). We
replicate the ﬁnding that groups take signiﬁcantly more risk than isolated individuals.
We also ﬁnd that individuals who consult with others signiﬁcantly aﬀect each other’s
risk-taking, as evidenced by signiﬁcant convergence in consultation groups. But indi-
viduals who consult take similar levels of risk as isolated individuals, which supports
the notion that pay-oﬀ commonality between group members, alongside communication
with others, is a distinctive feature of the group decision making process.
Chapter four presents an experiment with the same investment task as chapter three,
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in which we compare risk-taking of groups with diﬀerent cultural compositions. We test
the prediction that groups with greater international diversity, as measured by subject
nationality and familiarity with the English language, take less risk than more homo-
geneous groups. This prediction is based on prevalent theories of team diversity from
the literature on management decision making (see Jehn et al., 1999), as well as a small
body of empirical work (Watson & Kumar, 1992; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). Using a
regression model that controls for various demographic factors, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences
in risk-taking between groups of diﬀerent levels of international diversity. Using real
incentives and a subject pool of university students, whose upbringing, education and
international orientation we take to be representative of that of future global business
leaders, we thus ﬁnd no implications of international diversity on group risk outcomes.
We do ﬁnd, however, a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect of gender composition on risk-
taking: the more female group members, the more risk averse a group is. This gender
eﬀect mirrors a common demographic pattern in individual decisions under risk, and
also matches the results from an experiment in a ﬁnance context (Bogan et al., 2011).
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the signiﬁcance and size of gender eﬀect is independent of
whether group members communicate face-to-face or by electronic chat on a computer
screen. The latter ﬁnding suggests that demographic diﬀerences in individual risk pref-
erences can explain the gender eﬀect, but conformity to gender stereotypes does not.
Chapter ﬁve is an experimental test of group polarisation, a potential outcome of group
decisions attributed to the exchange of information between group members (Vinokur
& Burstein, 1974). Following recent theoretical work on group polarisation (Glaeser
& Sunstein, 2009; Sobel, 2012), we conduct an experiment on group risk-taking that
controls for the information that group members receive and can exchange with others.
Subjects receive information in the form of private signals correlated with the probabil-
ity of winning a risky lottery; signals which they can share with fellow group members.
We ﬁnd that, although groups aggregate information eﬃciently and the vast majority
of subjects adjust their risk-taking in the expected direction given their signals, levels
of group polarisation are low. For groups in which all members receive identical signals
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and for which Bayesian updating predicts a high likelihood of group polarisation, only
half of the groups polarise. The lack of group polarisation in these groups is driven
by idiosyncratic actions by a single individual in the majority of cases. These ﬁndings
suggest that polarisation with respect to risk-taking in small groups is highly sensitive
to decisions of individual subjects. We also ﬁnd that the majority of subjects display
social preferences over risk by co-ordinating their decisions with fellow group members
in a group choice stage, and we ﬁnd signiﬁcant spill-over eﬀects of the group choice on
subsequent individual choice.
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Chapter 2
Group decisions under risk: a
review of the experimental
literature
2.1 Introduction
Evidence from experiments has greatly inﬂuenced economic thinking about decision
making by individuals. But in many important settings, the decision maker is not an
individual but a group. Examples abound: households planning their ﬁnances, corpo-
rate management teams deciding on business strategy, government committees involved
in policy making. This observation raises the question whether the lessons learned from
experiments with individuals also apply to groups. In recent years, economists have
started to address the dearth of empirical evidence on group decisions by collecting
data on groups in the laboratory. In this review, we focus on those experiments that
look at group decisions under risk.
Economists are not the ﬁrst to use experiments to investigate group decisions under
risk; experimental research on groups started with the birth of social psychology in the
early twentieth century (Allport, 1924). The social psychology literature on risky choice
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includes the discovery of phenomena such as the risky shift (Stoner, 1961) and group
polarisation (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), which have inspired economics experiments
in recent times. Because a review of group decisions under risk would not be complete
without acknowledging these eﬀorts, we discuss the results from psychology experiments
alongside economic experiments.
The experimental evidence in this review is organised around three empirical questions:
(i) Do groups take more or less risk than individuals, (ii) Are groups more rational
risk takers than individuals, and (iii) Does group interaction aﬀect individual decisions
under risk? Each of these questions represents a common thread of inquiry running
through part of the experimental literature, and organising the evidence in this way
helps us summarise the lessons learned about group decision making so far. This re-
view, therefore, is only comprehensive with respect to studies that contribute to a better
understanding of our three questions of interest; this chapter is not an exhaustive review
of all experiments on group decisions under risk.
2.1.1 Three questions about group decisions under risk
Most experiments described herein investigate whether risk-taking by groups diﬀers
from risk-taking by individuals in a systematic, perhaps even predictable, fashion. We
therefore choose this as our ﬁrst question of interest about group decision under risk.
Broadly speaking, the null hypothesis is that groups take just as much risk as individ-
uals, and the alternative hypothesis is that groups take more or less risk. If it were
true that, at least for certain circumstances created in the laboratory, groups reliably
take more or less risk than individuals, such a ﬁnding could be a promising building
block for theories on risk-taking outcomes in the real world.1 Unfortunately, the ex-
perimental evidence gathered so far does not support the existence of a simple and
1A good example of a robust laboratory ﬁnding in decisions under risk is the gender eﬀect: women
take less risk than men (Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). This gender eﬀect has
also been found outside of the laboratory, for example in investment portfolios held at on-line brokers
(Barber & Odean, 2001).
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robust pattern. The evidence is mixed, with groups taking less, as much, and more
risk than individuals in diﬀerent experimental settings. It appears that the choice shift
paradigm from the psychology literature, in which subjects make group decisions after
making individual decisions and earnings are hypothetical, often leads to diﬀerences
between individual and group decisions. By contrast, most economics experiments with
between-subject treatment comparisons and real incentives ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between risk-taking in groups and individuals. Experiments of the latter kind do yield
some interesting ﬁndings, however, such as groups reacting more strongly to extremely
low and high lottery winning probabilities (Baker et al., 2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008)
and groups acting more in line with risk neutrality than individuals (Sutter, 2009). But
reports of such ﬁndings has not been suﬃciently widespread to properly consider them
stylised facts.
The second question of interest is whether groups are more rational risk takers than
individuals. The origins of this question lie in the many violations of Expected Util-
ity Theory (EUT) detected in experiments on individual decision making under risk.
In defence of EUT, some have argued that subjects in laboratory experiments are too
poorly motivated or inexperienced to make the choices they would make if the outcome
really mattered (see Myagkov & Plott, 1997). Providing subjects with stronger mon-
etary incentives and putting them through practice rounds are two devices that have
repeatedly been put forward as ways forcing people to think more carefully about their
choices, thus reducing violations of EUT in many experimental settings. It is plausible
that decision making in a group also reduces EUT violations, by making people reason
about their choices with others (Bone et al., 1999). In a review of group decision making
experiments with a focus on cognitive and strategic tasks, Charness & Sutter (2012)
note that groups are less likely to be inﬂuenced by biases and cognitive limitations than
individuals. This pattern does not seem evident in decisions under risk, however. The
available evidence, although limited to tests of a handful of EUT violations, does not
support the notion that groups are less prone to decisions making biases and EUT vio-
lations than individuals.
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The third question addressed in this review is whether group discussion or group in-
teraction aﬀects subsequent individual decisions. This question is related to the ﬁrst
question but describes a more subtle eﬀect: even choices not formally delegated to a
group may still be shaped by consulting with a group. Decision making based on group
consultation is a feature of many important settings, such as organisational decision
makers discussing the pros and cons of diﬀerent options with their subordinates, and
politicians being assisted by teams of policy advisors. This question is of particular
relevance to economic theory, since economists have traditionally modelled individual
decisions under risk as arising from the risk preferences of the individual. If there is
strong empirical evidence that social interaction has an eﬀect on individual choices,
this provides support for theories that take this social inﬂuence into account. The
experimental evidence suggests that it is very common for group interaction to aﬀect
individual decisions: most of the reported studies ﬁnd an eﬀect. We also review some
results from the growing experimental literature on peer eﬀects, providing evidence that
individual risk-taking can be aﬀected by the choices of others choosing at the same time.
Economists know little about the thought process that underlies social inﬂuence on in-
dividual choices in incentivised experiments, which oﬀers exciting prospects for future
research.
2.2 Definitions and objectives
2.2.1 What is a group decision under risk?
A group decision under risk is deﬁned as the process by which g > 1 individuals in a
group select one lottery l out of a set of available lotteries L. In other words, the group
members’ combined actions in a decision making stage will result in the implementa-
tion of lottery l by the experimenter, the outcome of which will determine each group
member’s earnings. Subject earnings may be real or hypothetical. For any pair of lot-
teries in the set L, the lottery with the higher variance is considered the riskier option.
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Most experimenters design their experiments such that all lotteries in the choice set L
can be ranked on riskiness according to their variance. Being able to rank all available
lotteries on riskiness, the researcher can use experimental data to test null hypothe-
ses on subjects’ tendency to choose the risky over the safe option (for binary choices)
or the level of riskiness of subjects’ choices (for more than two levels of risk-taking).
Some experimenters, such as those working with the Multiple Price List method (Holt
& Laury, 2002), also use metrics like the number of safe choices or certainty equivalents
for lotteries. Most of the experiments we discuss use metrics of risk-taking to compare
group choices to individual choices over the same lotteries. When comparing groups
to individuals in an experiment with real monetary incentives, the standard procedure
is to ensure that each group member faces the same lottery outcomes as they would
have faced if they had chosen the same lottery as an individual - thus avoiding wealth
diﬀerences between treatments.
The above deﬁnition of group decisions under risk leaves undeﬁned the exact link be-
tween group members’ actions during the decision making stage and the selected lottery.
There are, after all, various ways in which a group can arrive at a single decision, and
the decision rules of the experiments reviewed here reﬂect this diversity. Examples of
decision rules are unstructured bargaining, formal or informal opinion polls, and vot-
ing. Most experiments we review here use unstructured bargaining, and groups are
expected to make a consensus decision without interference from the experimenter. Al-
though unstructured bargaining does not permit a clean theoretical prediction of the
group outcome without auxiliary assumptions on subject preferences and behaviour,
this need not be a problem. We are, after all, not testing game theoretic predictions
of group processes. In the context of this review, we are interested in ﬁnding stylised
facts of decisions under risk in a natural group discussion setting. If and to what extent
group decisions under risk are aﬀected by the choice of decision rule is an open empir-
ical question; the experimental evidence gathered so far does not give any clear answers.
Finally, we note that some authors in the experimental literature discussed here refer to
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their groups as teams. For the sake of clarity and consistency, we shall stick to groups
throughout this review. In the experimental literature on risk-taking, the terms teams
and groups can be used interchangeably.2
2.2.2 A note on experimental methodology
The shared objective of controlled psychology and economic experiments with groups is
to collect data that leads to a better understanding of groups in the real world. Despite
this common goal, experimental designs in psychology and economics are informed by
diﬀerent methodological traditions. Before discussing ﬁndings from both ﬁelds, it is
worth highlighting a few diﬀerences in approach.
Incentives
The use of hypothetical incentives allows researchers to investigate decisions under risk
for which collecting real experimental data is too hard, expensive or unethical. But
economists are typically sceptical about experimental results obtained with hypotheti-
cal incentives (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Harrison & Rutström, 2008). It is unlikely,
so the argument goes, that subjects will reveal their actual risk attitudes in response to
hypothetical questions, especially in unfamiliar situations like life-or-death decisions or
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investments. There is some empirical support for such scepticism.
For choices over monetary lotteries, the results of Holt & Laury (2002, 2005) provide
evidence that hypothetical and real risk-taking start to diverge signiﬁcantly when stakes
go up, leading to unreliable hypothetical data.
Despite the oft-heard criticism of hypothetical risk attitude elicitation methods, we do
2Other disciplines and sub-ﬁelds have more or less agreed deﬁnitions that distinguish between groups
and teams. An oft-cited deﬁnition of a team is Katzenbach & Smith (1992): “A team is a small number
of people with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose, performance goals, and
approach for which they are mutually accountable”. This deﬁnition captures a sense of co-operation
that makes a team a more persistent and coherent unit than a group assembled for the sole purpose
of making choices in a laboratory task.
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discuss many experiments with hypothetical incentives here. Although doubts about the
validity of hypothetical methods are certainly relevant when assessing the balance of evi-
dence, this does not seem to justify ruling out experiments with hypothetical incentives
altogether. Especially when researchers are exploring a new area of interest, experi-
ments with hypothetical incentives can serve as an aﬀordable way to collect exploratory
data, and may inspire other researchers to develop related research questions in more
controlled settings. Second, the evidence that one particular hypothetical elicitation
method leads to biased data should not lead researchers to suspect all unincentivised
elicitation methods. In a recent study, Dohmen et al. (2011) report strong correlations
between a simple, unincentivised self-reported measure of risk tolerance and subjects’
actual behaviour under risk, including paid lottery choices.
Control and artificiality
It is well documented that experimental economists are typically more concerned about
control over experimental variables than psychologists (see Camerer, 1992; Lopes, 1994;
Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).3 Experimental control is seen as important because the
speciﬁcity of the tested hypotheses increases with the degree of control, leading to
cleaner data on the behaviour under study. But experimental control is a double-edged
sword. An undue focus on control can lead to experimental designs that are artiﬁcial
to the point where they no longer resemble the settings they are supposed to shed light
on. Consider context as an experimental variable. In economics experiments, it is con-
sidered good practice to minimise references to context and present subjects with an
abstract representation of a real world setting. This high level of abstraction is a re-
sult of economists’ desire to control for confounding factors: the biases and norms that
awareness of a certain context may trigger in the subjects. For example, an economist
might be sceptical of measuring risk attitudes through a gambling task in a casino.
Psychologists, on the other hand, have no qualms about studying behaviour in such a
3Camerer, for example, describes the metholodogy of experimental economics as more “fastidious” than
experimental psychology (Camerer, 1992, p. 247).
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heavy contextualised environment. The results of experimental studies in casinos may
be context-speciﬁc and thus not very robust. But if context exerts an important inﬂu-
ence on decisions under risk then it is plausible that abstract, context-free experiments
on decisions under risk are artiﬁcial and lacking in external validity.
Experimental economists have to be prepared to defend the artiﬁciality of their designs.
So how big a problem is artiﬁciality in the study of group decisions under risk? Follow-
ing Schram (2005), we consider artiﬁciality potentially problematic if the researcher’s
objective is to collect robust empirical facts, whereas it is less important if the objective
is to test a theory. It follows that researchers looking to identify whether groups take
more or less risk than individuals should be more concerned about producing artiﬁcial
results than researchers looking to establish whether groups are more EUT rational
than individuals.
Ultimately, whether an artiﬁcial design translates to a lack of external validity is an
empirical question. But the same is true for generalising the results from a highly
contextualised or ﬁeld experiment, such as studies in a casino. When attempting to
identify robust empirical facts, the gold standard is to demonstrate that a behavioural
regularity exists under comparable institutions in the laboratory and the ﬁeld. As we
will argue in the ﬁnal section of this chapter, there is a great need for ﬁeld experiments
to complement and inform the work that is being done in the lab. But ﬁrst we look at
the lessons learned from laboratory research so far.
2.3 Question one: do groups take more or less risk?
2.3.1 Choice shift experiments with hypothetical incentives
A seminal and perhaps the most famous attempt to address the question about risk-
taking in groups is Stoner (1961), in which subjects’ risk attitudes are measured with
the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) developed by Wallach & Kogan (1959). The
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CDQ contains twelve hypothetical dilemmas like the following:
Mr. A, an electrical engineer who is married and has one child, has been
working for a large electronics coorporation since graduating from college five
years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest, though adequate,
salary. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will increase
much before he retires. While attending a convention, Mr. A is offered a job
with a small, newly founded company with a highly uncertain future. The
new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a share
in the ownership if the company survived the competition of larger firms.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several probabilities
or odds of the new company’s proving financially sound. Please indicate the
lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it worthwile
for Mr. A. to take the new job. (Stoner, 1961, p. 11)
Stoner asks subjects to give an individual recommendation, before putting them into
groups and asking for a joint recommendation following a group discussion. It turns out
that most groups recommend more risk-taking (they indicate lower acceptable proba-
bilities) than the average of the individual members prior to discussion. This surprising
ﬁnding was dubbed the risky shift, and has been replicated many times since (see Myers,
1982; Isenberg, 1986). But groups do not always advise higher risk-taking in hypothet-
ical scenarios: follow-up studies by Nordhoy (1962) and Stoner (1968) reveal that some
choices in the CDQ actually lead to group recommendations that are more cautious.
As a result, changes of risk-taking when subjects make group choices after individual
choices have come to be described by the more general term choice shift. The fact
that choice shifts occur in both the risky and cautious directions has been attributed to
prevalent social norms for certain CDQ dilemmas (Brown, 1965). Another explanation
is provided by the theory of group polarisation (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), according
to which a group discussion serves to amplify the attitudes of the average group member.
2.3.2 Experiments with real incentives
Although the measurement of choice shifts with the CDQ has captured much of the
attention, a lesser known strand of experimental psychology, its designs much closer to
those of experimental economics, developed in the same decade.4 Experiments in this
alternative strand of research represent risk by gambles over monetary outcomes, often
backed up by real monetary pay-oﬀs. And, instead of the sequential within-subject
design (individual choice followed by group choice) used in the choice shift literature,
these experiments measure group-individual diﬀerentials between subjects.
Hunt & Rowe (1960) compare risk-taking in three-man groups and individuals in a
between-subject design. Their measure is the amount of hypothetical money invested
in diﬀerent investments, and they ﬁnd no diﬀerence in risk-taking between groups and in-
dividuals. A similar result is found by Lonergan & Mc Clintock (1961), who let subjects
bet real money on a lottery with a zero expected value and ﬁxed winning probability
in three treatments: individually in isolation, individually in the presence of others,
or in a four-person group. They ﬁnd that the size of bets do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between the three treatments, and that bets converge to a common norm in both the
treatment with individuals in the presence of others and the group treatment. Another
experiment with incentives is Zajonc et al. (1968), who let subjects choose between
two lotteries with equal expected value but diﬀerent variance. The outcomes in either
lottery are very small, and therefore the experiment is played for 360 rounds: subjects
choose individually for 180 rounds, then either continue individually or in three-person
groups for another 180 rounds. Zajonc et al. ﬁnd that groups choose the lottery with
lower variance signiﬁcantly more often than individuals do.
Pruitt & Teger (1969) compare groups with individuals by asking subjects to invest
real money in lotteries with expected values of zero. In the group treatment, groups of
4It has been suggested, not wholly implausibly, that CDQ experiments have received more attention
because their results are more striking. “Since the CDQ has produced the more dramatic ﬁndings,
it has had greater appeal, and the choice-dilemma paradigm has continued to dominate the ﬁeld”
(Cartwright, 1971, p. 361).
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varying size (from three to ﬁve subjects) make decisions by verbally reaching consensus.
The authors ﬁnd that groups make signiﬁcantly riskier choices than individuals. In a
follow-up study, Zaleska (1974) remarks that some of the data of Pruitt & Teger (1969)
suggests that subjects shift to caution as lottery stakes increase. To test whether this
tendency diﬀers between groups and individuals, Zaleska varies the expected value of
lottery choice sets in her within-subject experimental design (individual choice ﬁrst,
then group choice). Zaleska reports that groups are more risk seeking than individuals
for low expected value bets (such as the zero expected value lotteries used by Pruitt
& Teger), but more become relatively more cautious as expected value increases. In
other words, group membership strengthens the negative correlation between lottery
expected value and risk-taking. A closer look at the data shows that this correlation is
largely driven by the risk-taking diﬀerential for low value bets - there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between group and individual behaviour for higher value bets. This result
could be interpreted as evidence that risk diﬀerentials between groups and individuals
disappear when monetary stakes are high enough to really matter to subjects. Such a
conclusion would be in line with the rest of the experimental evidence discussed in this
section - most experiments ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in risk-taking between groups
and individuals. In contrast to the literature on choice shifts, measuring risk-taking over
real incentives in a between-subject design does not generally reveal diﬀerences between
groups and individuals. Whether this is due to the use of real monetary incentives or to
the experimental decision sequence (within-subject versus between-subject) is an open
empirical question.
2.3.3 Experiments with real incentives and risk-reward trade-offs
Experimental work on choice shifts and group attitudes to risk continued after the
1960s, but the main focus of this research shifted from identifying stylised facts to fal-
sifying various theories of group eﬀects. Although the latter objective is interesting
in its own right (see Isenberg, 1986; Turner, 1991; Friedkin, 1999, for reviews), it is
not the focus of this chapter. Recently, however, renewed interest in the stylised facts
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of group risk-taking from economists has inspired a new wave of laboratory experiments.
Most recent experiments have employed the Multiple Price List (MPL) in the conﬁg-
uration used by Holt & Laury (2002).5 Baker et al. (2008) use the MPL to compare
risk-taking in three-person groups with individuals. The authors report, when compar-
ing risk-taking between subjects, that the number of safe choices made by groups is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from individuals. However, Baker et al. report a signiﬁcant inter-
action eﬀect between the lottery win percentage and group treatment: as the winning
percentage increases, groups are more likely to choose the risky lottery than individuals.
This result suggests that groups respond diﬀerently to outcomes with extreme proba-
bilities: groups conform more to risk neutrality than individuals for choice pairs at the
top and bottom of the MPL. Shupp & Williams (2008) also use the MPL to compare
groups with individuals. To measure risk preferences, they ask subjects to submit a
purchase price for each of the lotteries, rather than choose between a safe and a risky
option. The purchase price for a lottery measures the subject’s risk preferences - the
higher the submitted price for a lottery, the higher the risk taken by the subject. If the
submitted purchase price equals the lottery’s expected value then the subject is acting
as if risk neutral. As in the study by Baker et al. (2008), Shupp & Williams ﬁnd that
the choice pattern reveals a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between group membership
and the probability of winning. For low win probabilities, groups are more risk averse
than individuals; for high win probabilities, groups are more risk loving. It is remark-
able that the interaction eﬀect between group membership and probability of winning
is reported by both Baker et al. (2008) and Shupp & Williams (2008). As the lottery
winning percentage goes up in the MPL of Shupp & Williams (2008), group decisions
5The Multiple Price List is a popular tool for eliciting subjects’ risk preferences. It features a list of
choices between pairs of binary lotteries: a ’safe’ lottery with a small diﬀerence between win and loss
outcomes and a ’risky’ lottery with a large diﬀerence between outcomes. Subjects are asked to choose
between the safe and risky option in each of ten lottery pairs. Whilst the lottery outcomes are the
same for all choices, the probability of winning goes up from 10% in the ﬁrst pair to 100% in the last
pair. The last lottery pair thus features a choice between two guaranteed pay-oﬀs, of which the risky
pair is the highest. Researchers use a subject’s number of safe lottery choices (or the switching point -
the pair at which the subject switches from the safe to the risky lottery) as a measure of the subject’s
risk preferences. In experiments with the MPL, a common ﬁnding is that the majority of subjects
make more safe choices than a money maximising risk neutral decision maker would, that is to say
the majority of subjects is risk averse (Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005).
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approach risk neutrality faster than individual decisions. The authors conjecture that
incentives play a role: “...group discussion is more likely to facilitate outcomes that are
consistent with risk neutrality when the decision costs required to reach this solution
are oﬀset by a suﬃciently large expected monetary gain.” (Shupp & Williams, 2008, p.
274). It seems that experiments with large enough incentive diﬀerentials between risk
averse and risk neutral behaviour can be used to put this hypothesis to the test.
One experiment with signiﬁcantly higher incentives than usual campus experiments
(average earnings of e45 for one hour and twenty minutes) is Masclet et al. (2009),
which uses the MPL to compare three-person groups with individuals. The group
decision making stage diﬀers from the aforementioned papers: subjects do not commu-
nicate directly, but go through ﬁve rounds of computerised unanimity rule voting with
a computer-generated random choice in case no winner emerges. Despite this institu-
tional diﬀerence, the authors also report a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between group
membership and probability of winning percentage, consistent with the results of Baker
et al. (2008) and Shupp & Williams (2008). More surprising is the result that groups
are signiﬁcantly more likely to opt for the safe choice than individuals across the ten
lotteries. Group decisions in Masclet et al. are more consistent with risk neutrality
than individuals in the low winning percentage lotteries, but relatively less consistent
with risk neutrality in the high winning percentage lotteries.
Zhang & Casari (2010) conduct a within-subjects MPL experiment (individual choice,
then group choice after deliberation) in which each group member submits a preferred
choice before the deliberation stage. If all three group members submit the same prefer-
ence for a given lottery pair choice, then this is taken as the unanimous voting outcome.
If there is disagreement, groups can communicate via an on-screen chat window to re-
solve their diﬀerences. Groups have a strong incentive to reach consensus: a non-decision
means zero earnings for all group members. Zhang & Casari report that groups are more
risk loving than individuals, but only for lotteries in which the risky option coincides
with risk neutrality. Furthermore, when there is disagreement between group members’
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preferred choices, the majority preference is most likely to prevail if it matches the risk
neutral prediction. Lastly, the authors report that the submitted pre-deliberation pre-
ferred group choices tend to match individual choices from the ﬁrst stage. This result
suggests that people’s choices in groups diﬀer in predictable ways (more risk neutrality)
from their individual preferences.
Not all MPL experiments report diﬀerences between group and individual risk-taking,
however. Deck et al. (2010) use the number of safe choices in an MPL task as a measure
of risk preferences, but ﬁnd no diﬀerence between pairs and individuals. The authors
report a small diﬀerence in the number of safe choices for low winning percentage lot-
teries (groups make more safe choices), but they cannot reject the hypothesis that the
distribution of number of safe choices is the same for pairs and individuals.
Sutter (2007) uses an investment task designed by Gneezy & Potters (1997) to test for
myopic loss aversion in groups of three subjects.6 Sutter ﬁnds that groups are less
prone to myopic loss aversion and, more important, take signiﬁcantly more risk than
individuals. As a result, group choices are closer to risk neutrality and thus achieve
higher expected pay-oﬀs. In a follow-up experiment, Sutter (2009) replicates the result
of higher risk-taking by groups and also for groups in which decisions are made by a
single group member and communication is limited to a single message to the decision
maker. Analysis of the messages sent between subjects in this treatment suggests that
expected value maximisation is a major factor behind higher risk-taking in these groups.
A similar result is reported in chapter three of this thesis, based on a content analysis
of the logged messages of a group discussion by electronic chat.
6Myopic loss aversion is a prominent behavioural explanation for the equity premium puzzle, ﬁrst
suggested by Benartzi & Thaler (1995). It is based on the observation that investors who check the
value of their investments more frequently (a myopic perspective) are more likely to sell their equity
after observing a short-term loss.
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2.3.4 Experiments with experienced groups
Most groups in laboratory experiments are formed by randomly allocating subjects to
groups at the start of the experiment. Although ad hoc randomised assignment con-
trols for eﬀects arising from biased group composition, it might prevent groups from
operating in an eﬃcient manner due to a lack of familiarity between members. Many
important settings in the real world feature groups that have been making decisions
together for a while; it is interesting to see how decisions in these experienced groups
compare to the decisions of their individual members. The experiments we discuss here
have investigated the decisions of particularly experienced real world decision making
groups: co-habitating and married couples.
Bateman & Munro (2005) ask married couples to make choices between risky lotteries
together and individually; one of the choices is picked at random to determine subject
earnings. The authors ﬁnd that couples’ choices are signiﬁcantly more risk averse than
either partner in isolation. Because these results cannot be compared to choices of
ad hoc laboratory groups, these results do not tell us much about the eﬀect of being
married on joint versus individual decisions. The closest to such a comparison is the
study by He et al. (2011), who visit the houses of co-habitating student couples with
a MPL task to measure risk attitudes. Unlike Bateman & Munro (2005), He et al. do
not ﬁnd that subjects take signiﬁcant less or more risk for all lotteries when making
decisions as couples. In line with the results from the laboratory literature (Baker et al.,
2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008), they report that decisions made by couples are more
extreme at the top and the bottom of the MPL. As a result, these decisions are more in
line with risk neutrality. This result supports the notion that experienced groups make
choices comparable to those of ad hoc laboratory groups in simple incentivised decisions
under risk. Whether decisions under risk of experienced groups deviate from those of
ad hoc groups in more context-heavy settings is, to my knowledge, still an open question.
It is worth mentioning a pair of experimental studies with married couples that investi-
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gate a diﬀerent question: to what extent are a couple’s decisions under risk inﬂuenced
by either spouse? De Palma et al. (2011) let spouses make separate, individual choices
between risky lotteries in six rounds, and then bring couples together to make choices
between lotteries in an additional six rounds. They ﬁnd that the distance between the
husband’s preferred risk outcome and the couple’s choice increases over time, whereas
the distance between the wife’s preferred risk outcome and the couple’s choice stays
the same. The authors report this ﬁnding as suggesting that the balance of power be-
tween the spouses changes over the course of the experiment. While De Palma et al.
use German couples, Carlsson et al. (2012) employ a similar experimental procedure in
rural China. Carlsson et al. report that risk-taking by couples in their subject pool is
skewed towards the husband’s risk preferences, but that the inﬂuence of the husband is
mitigated by greater household income, a greater share of the household income earned
by the wife, and the wife having communist party membership.
2.4 Question two: are groups more rational risk takers?
2.4.1 Violations of Expected Utility Theory
There is ample experimental evidence that individual decisions under risk often violate
the predictions of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (see Starmer, 2000, for a review).
Some scholars have described these violations as decision making errors (Savage, 1972),
raising the question whether subjects’ decisions can be improved by learning or expe-
rience. One way by which subjects’ could reduce their error rate is by talking to other
subjects, as is the case in groups. This leads to the prediction that groups violate EUT
less often than individuals, as suggested by Bone et al. (1999). If the rate of EUT
violations decreases when subjects decide in groups, this suggests that EUT is a more
relevant model of decisions under risk than experiments with individuals alone would
lead one to believe.
The typical structure of an experiment testing for EUT violations is the following. Sub-
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jects face two related choices in A-or-B lottery pairs. The lottery pairs are related in the
sense that for a particular choice in the ﬁrst pair, EUT predicts a choice in the second
pair. For example, the EUT null hypothesis would have it that choosing A in the ﬁrst
pair implies a preference for B in the second pair. Subjects choosing A or B in both
pairs thus constitutes a violation of EUT. A particular cognitive bias or eﬀect usually
describes one particular violation (for example, choosing A in both pairs) whereas the
usually less common reverse eﬀect (choosing B in both pairs) is a violation of EUT but
does not conﬁrm the cognitive bias.
Bone et al. (1999) test for the common ratio eﬀect in pairs of subjects by letting them
choose between pairs of lotteries.7 The experiment has three stages: subjects ﬁrst choose
individually, then in a pair with another subject, then individually again. Presenting the
subjects with four diﬀerent choice tasks with lotteries of varying probabilities, the au-
thors ﬁnd that groups display the common ratio eﬀect just as often as individuals do in
each of the four tasks. But the data do reveal a diﬀerence in risk-taking: groups choose
the risky option more often than individuals in each of the four choice tasks. This result
is perhaps due to money maximising: taking more risk increases the expected earnings
of subjects in every choice task. Groups therefore achieve higher expected earnings than
individuals by taking more risk. Bone et al. use data from the ﬁrst and third stages of
their experiment to compare individual decisions before and after the group decision.
They ﬁnd that individuals have not learned to become more EUT-consistent after their
group decisions; if anything, their EUT consistency has gone down. This is not hugely
surprising, given the fact that groups are just as prone to the common ratio eﬀect as
individuals. They also note that, even when compared to the post-group individual
decisions, groups still take more risk than individuals.
Bateman & Munro (2005) test for the incidence of the common ratio eﬀect, common
7The common ratio eﬀect describes people’s tendency to prefer a safe lottery when comparing lotteries
with high probabilities of winning, but switch to a risky lottery when winning probabilities of both
lotteries are scaled down by the same factor (see Allais, 1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
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consequence effect and failure of the betweenness property in married couples.8 Spouses
ﬁrst choose individually, then are asked to predict the other person’s choices - thus en-
couraging further reﬂection on the lottery choices - and, ﬁnally, make a choice as a
couple. Their results do not show any diﬀerence in EUT consistency between subjects
choosing as individuals and with their partner for any of the EUT violations.
Rockenbach et al. (2007) test for the common ratio eﬀect, preference reversals and refer-
ence point eﬀect in an experiment with groups of three subjects.9 For the common ratio
and preference reversal eﬀects, they cannot reject the null hypothesis that groups are
just as prone to the EUT violation as individuals. Group choices for the reference point
eﬀect lotteries, however, have a signiﬁcantly higher fraction of EUT-consistent choices
than individuals. The reference point eﬀect lottery pairs were generated by giving sub-
jects a guaranteed pre-choice endowment in the ﬁrst pair, whereas the same amount
of money was added to all lottery outcomes in the second lottery pair. These results
therefore tell us that groups are better than individuals at integrating endowments into
lottery choices, thus reducing EUT violations.
Rockenbach et al. (2007) test for preference reversals over lotteries in a controlled eco-
nomics experiment, without any context. To see to what extent preference reversals
aﬀect group decisions in a contextualised setting, we must look to psychology exper-
iments. Mowen & Gentry (1980) devise a product introduction task that features a
choice and a selling price elicitation mode. They ﬁnd that groups display signiﬁcantly
8The common consequence eﬀect is the tendency of people to change preference between lotteries when
a lottery probability-outcome combination common to both lotteries is changed. The betweenness
property (in EUT and other theories of choice) requires that the utility ranking for a lottery created
by probabilistically mixing two other lotteries lies in between the decision maker’s preference over
those two lotteries.
9A preference reversal is the tendency for people’s preference ordering over outcomes to depend on
the preference elicitation procedure. The original experiments on preference reversals (Lichtenstein &
Slovic, 1971) had subjects either make a choice which of two lotteries to play or to submit a selling
price for each of the same two lotteries. The result, which has been replicated in many laboratory and
ﬁeld settings (Tversky & Thaler, 1990), is that the lottery which is more popular in the choice task
is typically ranked below the other lottery in terms of submitted selling prices. The reference point
eﬀect is people’s tendency to deﬁne outcomes as losses or gains depending on a particular reference
point - an important building block of the loss aversion property of prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979).
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more preference reversals than individuals. Another experiment on preference reversals
in groups ﬁnd exactly the opposite result: Irwin & Davis (1995) report that groups
display fewer preference reversals than individuals. It should be noted that the second
elicitation mode in Irwin & Davis (1995) was not a selling price task but a matching task
in which one attribute of a lottery outcome is adjusted to make up for another attribute.
2.4.2 Framing effects
An oft-cited criticism of EUT as a theory of choice is that it fails to take into account
how the options in a decision problem are presented. For example, identical outcomes
under risk can be framed in diﬀerent ways depending on the decision maker’s refer-
ence point. Tversky & Kahneman (1981) famously showed that subjects’ preferences
over identical pairs of hypothetical outcomes change, depending on whether options
are framed as losses or gains relative to the status quo. These so-called framing ef-
fects have been shown to be robust in individuals, and have led researchers to ask to
what extent they aﬀect decisions by groups. McGuire et al. (1987) let subjects make
individual hypothetical investment choices in loss and gain frames, before putting them
in groups and asking them to make the same choices again. They ﬁnd that groups
are more prone to framing eﬀects than individuals, but only if the group discusses the
alternatives face-to-face. For groups communicating by electronic computer chat, the
strength of the framing eﬀect was similar to individuals. This ﬁnding echoes the results
of Neale et al. (1986), who use the original framing task from Tversky & Kahneman
(1981) and ﬁnd that groups are more prone to the framing eﬀect if the group members
answer the question in the same frame they faced individually beforehand. Paese et al.
(1993) and Yaniv (2011) replicate this ﬁnding, but also ﬁnd that the susceptibilitity of
groups to framing eﬀects actually decreases if the groups face a frame diﬀerent from
the frame they saw individually. Finally, Milch et al. (2009), using a slightly modiﬁed
version of the task used in the previous studies, ﬁnd that groups are no more or less
susceptible to framing eﬀects than individuals. Furthermore, their result holds both for
groups whose members have faced the framed questions individually before and groups
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whose members see the question for the ﬁrst time.
In summary, the experimental evidence reviewed here does not suggest that group de-
cisions under risk are more EUT rational, or less susceptible to biases than individuals.
None of the controlled economics experiments ﬁnds a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the num-
ber of EUT violations, and the evidence from psychology experiments is mixed. The
ﬁndings discussed above show that, although groups typically perform better and more
consistently in probability estimates, strategic reasoning and learning tasks (Charness &
Sutter, 2012), their superiority to individuals does not imply that groups display more
rational choice behaviour. Unless researchers can identify conditions under which group
decisions are more rational, it seems that decision making biases from the literature on
individual decision making under risk are equally relevant for group decisions.
2.5 Question three: does group interaction influence indi-
vidual risk-taking?
2.5.1 Choice shift experiments with hypothetical incentives
We now turn to the ﬁnal question, which concerns the eﬀect of group interaction on
individual decisions under risk, rather than group decisions themselves. Many of the
psychology studies in the choice shift literature, discussed in more detail in the earlier
section on group risk-taking, have addressed this question by letting subjects taking an-
other individual decision after the group decision stage. The results from these studies
indicate that the group choice shift persists in most individual post-discussion decisions
(Bem et al., 1965; Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Kogan & Wallach, 1966), although not all in
cases (Blank, 1968). Other studies show that active participation in a group discussion
is not strictly required for individual decisions to be aﬀected. Choice shifts arise even
if subjects merely inform each other of their previous choice (Teger et al., 1970), listen
to a previously recorded group decision (Kogan & Wallach, 1967), or witness a group
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discussion through a one-way mirror (Lamm, 1967). In summary, the evidence indicates
that, in the sequential within-subjects design of the choice shift literature, group discus-
sion strongly aﬀects subsequent individual decisions over hypothetical outcomes. In line
with choice shifts in groups, group discussion either decreases or increases risk-taking
in subsequent individual decisions.
2.5.2 Experiments with real incentives
The earlier cited paper by Baker et al. (2008) also contains a separate within-subjects
treatment: individual choice ﬁrst, then a three-person group choice, then individual
choice again. They report that previous group membership signiﬁcantly aﬀects individ-
ual choices. Groups make more safe choices than individuals, and individual choices in
the ﬁnal stage are more risk averse than earlier individual choices. There is thus a clear
order eﬀect: group choice aﬀects subsequent individual choice. Another study with a
group decision order eﬀect, but in the opposite direction, is the MPL task of Deck et al.
(2010). The authors report that individuals who have already made a decision in a pair
are more risk loving than individuals who have not done so. The order eﬀect reported
by Deck et al. is not entirely consistent with the theory that risk-taking in groups
spills over into subsequent individual decisions, as this stage is statistically identical to
ﬁrst-time risk-taking by individuals in a parallel treatment.
Sutter (2009) uses a modiﬁed version of his nine-round investment task to check for or-
der eﬀects of group decisions on individual decisions. Subjects make individual decisions
for three rounds, then in a three-person group for three rounds, then again individually
for three rounds. Subjects choose signiﬁcantly higher investments (taking more risk) in
groups, and stay at these higher levels of investment in the last three rounds of individ-
ual choice. Because higher risk-taking by groups in this investment task has been linked
to higher expected value for more risk, it is possible that individuals learn from their
fellow group members about the expected return from taking more risk, and therefore
choose to mirror the group decision.
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2.5.3 Peer effects
A more subtle way in which individuals might be inﬂuenced by their reference groups
is through so-called peer eﬀects. Peer eﬀects occur when people’s individual decisions
demonstrably move in the direction of the decisions of others in a reference group. Field
studies have shown that peer eﬀects inﬂuence people’s decisions under risk, for example
their demand for insurance (Gine et al., 2008; Karlan et al., 2012) or whether to invest
money in a risky asset (Bursztyn et al., 2012). Because peer eﬀects are hard to detect
empirically due to confounding factors (Manski, 1993), incentivised laboratory studies
are an ideal vehicle for controlled tests of peer eﬀects.
Yechiam et al. (2008) form pairs of subjects and show each of them a real-time broadcast
from the other subject’s choice screen whilst both subjects are in the process of mak-
ing a choice between lotteries. The authors ﬁnd that subjects take signiﬁcantly more
risk when there is mutual observation, but that the eﬀect disappears if only one sub-
ject can observe the other. Cooper & Rege (2011) also let their subjects make choices
between risky lotteries, and show them feedback on other subjects’ choices after each
period. They also ﬁnd evidence of peer eﬀects: subjects are signiﬁcantly more likely
to change their choice of lottery if it deviates from the most popular choice among
other subjects, and this social inﬂuence on risk-taking in one gamble spills over into
other gambles. Similar results are reported by Viscusi et al. (2011), who let subjects
observe other subjects’ investment amounts in a risky gamble before they make indi-
vidual decisions. Subjects invest signiﬁcantly more if they observe others’ decisions,
and interestingly enough this risk diﬀerential does not arise for subjects who choose in
groups with majority or unanimity decision rules. Viscusi et al. thus observe a risky
shift for peer-observed choice, but not for group choice. This latter ﬁnding contrasts
with chapter three of this thesis, in which we report signiﬁcantly more risk-taking of
three-person groups compared to individuals in an investment task, but no increased
risk-taking by individuals who consult with and view the choices of two other subjects.
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In chapter three, we do ﬁnd that subjects’ consultation with other subjects leads to a
convergence of investment amounts in each consultation group.
In summary, there is much experimental evidence that prior interaction in groups, and
social interaction more generally, has an eﬀect on individual decisions under risk. When
the prior group interaction includes an actual group decision, individual choices gener-
ally mirror the group decision. When prior group or social interaction does not include
a group decision, the interaction can aﬀect individual decisions in several ways. In some
cases, prior social interaction leads to shifts in risk-taking; in other cases, social interac-
tion leads to convergence of individual choices towards fellow group members’ choices or
the group members’ most popular choice. Exactly why some conditions lead to choice
shifts, while other settings lead to convergence of choices, is unclear. There is evidence
that both convergence and choice shifts can occur in the same task: in chapter three
of this thesis, we ﬁnd that choice shifts towards greater risk-taking occur for groups,
whereas subjects who discuss their individual decisions’ without pay-oﬀ commonality
display no choice shift but converge to the choices of others in their discussion group.
These results show that decisions shaped by group interaction can be fundamentally
diﬀerent from those inﬂuenced by peers.
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed the laboratory literature on group decisions under
risk with a focus on three questions of interest. The answer to the most often asked
question, whether groups take more or less risk than individuals, seems to depend on
the experimental design. In between-subjects designs with hypothetical incentives, com-
monly used in the pyschology literature, group choices tend to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
individual choices. These so-called choice shifts can go either way: groups take either
less or more risk than individuals. Individual decisions after group interaction often mir-
ror choice shifts, reﬂecting a general tendency for experimental subjects to model their
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individual decisions after what was previously decided in a group. In within-subject
experiments with real incentives, however, choice shifts are rare and groups decisions
are typically similar to individual decisions. It thus seems appropriate to say that choice
shifts may arise in some settings, but diﬀerences between groups and individuals are
not a general feature of decision making under risk in the laboratory.
If we want to explain the mixed experimental evidence, economists need to deepen their
understanding of the driving forces behind group decisions. Barber et al. (2003) sug-
gest that group decisions are based on ‘good reasons’, which in their experimental stock
picking task translates to the observation that groups hold signiﬁcantly more stocks
of widely admired companies. The good reasons hypothesis implies that the reasons
behind a group decisions are often speciﬁc to the decision context (e.g. stock markets),
rather than based on universal features of decision making under risk, such as expected
return or risk rates. There is some evidence from between-subjects experimental designs
that groups in the laboratory are more risk-neutral than individuals, using expected re-
turn as an important decision criterion. Whether the importance of the expected return
argument diminishes in more contextualised ﬁeld settings, is an interesting and relevant
empirical question. What the evidence to date does show, however, is that group deci-
sions are not more in line with EUT than individual decisions. Groups display various
violations of EUT at the same rate as individuals, and are equally susceptible to con-
textual biases like framing eﬀects and preference reversals.
The recent literature on group decisions under risk consists mainly of experiments that
compare groups and individuals. Although such comparisons are of importance to the-
ory and interesting in their own right, the relevant practical question in many settings is
how to get the best decision out of a given group of people. It may be that unstructured
group discussion, often used in experiments because it seems the most natural way of
letting groups communicate, leads to diﬀerent outcomes than alternative decision rules.
Controlled experiments on diﬀerent decision making rules and institutions, such as the
work on jury decision making (see Palfrey, 2009), are a useful testing ground for sug-
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gested improvements to the decision making environment. Jury decision making is a
ﬁeld particularly suitable to experimental study, as decision quality can be evaluated by
controlling for information correlated with an uncertain state of the world (the defen-
dant being innocent or guilty). To illustrate: in experiments on jury decision making,
the likelihood of a guilty verdict for innocent people is often used as the ‘loss function’
for jury choices. Proposing the relevant loss function in other domains of risk-taking is
up to the researcher. For ﬁnancial risk, portfolio theory suggests that expected return
at a given level of risk is a good measure of decision quality. Rockenbach et al. (2007)
use this criterion to compare group and individual choices over risky lotteries in their
dataset, and conclude that groups are better risk takers than individuals. But other
considerations, such as liquidity and a guaranteed minimum return, might (or should)
also feed in to investors’ objectives. For decisions taken by management teams, it seems
that the preferences and expectations of shareholders should enter into the loss function.
For elected representatives, the preferences of their constituents should matter.
Another under-explored theme in the recent experimental literature is the eﬀect of group
composition on decisions. If a decision is going to be made by a group, what kind of in-
dividuals do we want the group to consist of? The empirical literature on management
diversity suggests that management teams function better, and are more inclined to
take risks, when team members are from similar social categories but diverse in terms
of their functional background (see Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Nielsen, 2010).
These empirical studies do not correct for confounds arising from company-speciﬁc fac-
tors that may simultaneously aﬀect the riskiness of corporate strategy and the diversity
of its management team. Such confounding factors can be excluded in controlled exper-
iments on group composition, but there are few such experiments. Watson & Kumar
(1992) ﬁnd that cultural diversity decreases risk-taking in a series of hypothetical risk
scenarios, and others ﬁnd that groups with more males take more risk in an incen-
tivised investment task (Bogan et al., 2011, see also chapter four of this thesis) . It is
particularly interesting to investigate whether careful group composition can mitigate
the extent to which group decisions are captured by vested interest, social norms and
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prevailing wisdom. As demonstrated by the recurrent nature of asset bubbles and the
ﬁnancial crises that they can lead to, the decisions of groups that reason myopically
and ignore the bigger picture can do great damage to their organisations and countries.
Experiments typically focus on a single function of groups, whether it be information
aggregation, specialisation and task distribution, insurance, greater bargaining power,
or a source of social identity and support. But groups and teams in the real world often
serve multiple purposes. Indeed, popular measures of group performance typically cor-
respond to a point-by-point evaluation of how well a group or team performs a subset
of these functions. In inﬂuential work in the management literature, Katzenbach &
Smith (1992); Katzenbach et al. (1993) deﬁne a taxonomy of (i) teams that recommend
things, (ii) teams that make or do things, and (iii) teams that run things, and suggest
that each type of team has to respond to diﬀerent challenges. Furthermore, they dis-
tinguish between working groups and teams, a theme that has so far not been picked
up by the experimental literature. According to their deﬁnition, working groups, like
randomly assembled groups in the laboratory, are focused on individual accountabil-
ity and results rather than joint responsibility. This means that working groups may
make fundamentally diﬀerent decisions than teams, especially when decisions have an
element of risk and thus potentially negative consequences. There is a big opportunity
for experimental work to identify how team risk-taking is aﬀected by a team’s oﬃcial,
unoﬃcial, and perceived functions and objectives.
More generally, the multiple functions and objectives of groups in the real world pose
a modelling challenge for controlled laboratory settings. If the researcher wants to test
the combined eﬀect of various supposed functions of groups on decision making, or if
the researcher is interested in investigating group decisions in an environment with the
greatest external validity, ﬁeld experiments might yield more reliable data than labo-
ratory work. The work on the risk preferences of married and co-habitating couples,
discussed earlier, is an example of attaining greater external validity through a diﬀer-
ent subject pool (artefactual ﬁeld experiments, following the taxonomy of Harrison &
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List (2004)). Another way of bringing experimental research closer to reality is to use
framed ﬁeld experiments: subjects make contextualised decisions, like the experiments
of Bogan et al. (2011) on stock investment. Field experiments that are both framed
and artefactual are eﬀectively full simulations of real decisions. But researchers can
go further than simulation. In many organisations, government or business, a great
number of routine decisions are taken by groups of people on a daily basis. If data on
these decisions is collected in a systematic way, and confounding factors are controlled
for, researchers can use such data to learn more about group decisions. For example,
by varying the format and type of information supplied to teams in charge of managing
risky assets, researchers can assess the eﬀect of information on group decisions. An or-
ganisation can thus learn about how its procedures for information management aﬀect
the risk taken on behalf of the organisation, and discover ways of mitigating excessive
risk-taking. Alternatively, some organisations actively encourage risk-taking by their
staﬀ in order to stimulate innovation. Many of these organisations have working groups
and teams dedicated to technology and product development. Systematically moni-
toring the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent group characteristics, decision rules and procedures
could provide valuable insight into how groups can be encouraged to take the right kind
of risks.
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Chapter 3
Risk taking in social settings: group
and peer effects
3.1 Introduction
The standard economic approach to the analysis of choice under uncertainty empha-
sises the role of individual risk preferences. In deciding how much to invest in a risky
asset individuals weigh up the costs and beneﬁts referring to these preferences. In con-
trast, in many important real-world settings individuals do not take choices in isolation,
and the social settings within which choices are made may inﬂuence behavior. For ex-
ample, individual choices may be swayed by the opinions and decisions of others. In
this chapter we investigate how consultation with others and group decision making
aﬀect choices under risk in a controlled laboratory setting. There is abundant evidence
from the ﬁeld that people’s choices are often inﬂuenced by their social networks. So-
called peer effects have been found in a number of settings, including, in the context
of choices under risk or uncertainty, investment decisions (Kelly & Grada, 2000; Hong
et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2008), entrepreneurship decisions (Nanda & Sørensen, 2010;
Lerner & Malmendier, 2011; Falck et al., 2012) and credit-funded consumption decisions
(Sotiropoulos & D’astous, 2012).
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While ﬁeld studies can provide compelling evidence of correlations between pairs of
individual decisions, identifying these as peer eﬀects is complicated by confounding fac-
tors (Manski, 1993). For example, correlations may reﬂect an unobserved characteristic
that is shared by the two individuals. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to assess the inﬂuence of
peer eﬀects from ﬁeld data, as naturally occurring control treatments where peer eﬀects
are absent but other variables are held constant are typically not available. For these
reasons we use a controlled experiment to investigate the eﬀect of social settings on
choice under uncertainty. In our experiment subjects make investment decisions over
multiple periods with feedback after each period. In our two consultation treatments
subjects are allowed to freely communicate with their peers before making a decision.
However, each subject’s earnings depend only on his or her own choices and not on the
choices of others. We use this framework because direct communication between peers
is an important feature of many settings where peers may inﬂuence one another. This
framework contrasts with related laboratory studies of peer eﬀects in which subjects are
informed of each other’s choices and may be inﬂuenced by these, but there is no direct
communication between subjects (for example, Yechiam et al., 2008; Cooper & Rege,
2011).1 In order to control for the inﬂuence of others’ choices we vary the degree of
feedback we oﬀer to subjects across the two consultation treatments. In one treatment
they are fully informed about the choices of others in their group while in the other
treatment they do not receive such feedback.
Our experiment is also related to experiments where subjects give and take advice (see
Schotter, 2003, for a review). However, our framework departs from these studies in
that we do not incentivise giving advice. Instead, the only motivations for our subjects
to give or take advice are intrinsic motivations independent of ﬁnancial consequences
(as in many examples of peer advice in everyday life). Also, our subjects face the same
task at the same time as their peers, whereas in other experiments on advice the ex-
perimental design induces diﬀerences between the experience and/or expertise of advice
1The direct peer eﬀects that we analyse are a special case of what Cooper & Rege (2011) call knowledge
spillovers: subjects can share information directly with others, instead of only observing others’ choices
and inferring information from them.
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givers and takers.
We compare our consultation treatments to two benchmark treatments, one where de-
cisions are made by isolated individuals and one where decisions are made by groups.
These benchmark treatments replicate previous ﬁndings of higher risk-taking by groups
relative to isolated individuals (Sutter, 2007, 2009). Our consultation treatments en-
able us to assess how much of the higher risk-taking in groups can be attributed to
communication between subjects. We ﬁnd that consultation does not increase average
investment beyond that observed among isolated individuals. Thus, direct communi-
cation alone cannot explain the higher risk-taking observed when decisions are made
by groups. This result underlines the importance of common pay-oﬀs for the diver-
gence of individual and group decisions under risk. We do, however, ﬁnd evidence of
peer eﬀects in our consultation treatments. Within consultative groups, variability in
choices is signiﬁcantly lower than the variability in choices between individuals from
diﬀerent groups. Thus, decisions in consultative groups tend to be closer together than
the choices of isolated individuals. While this convergence in decisions is not necessarily
surprising when subjects receive feedback about the decisions of other subjects in their
group it is also observed when such feedback is absent.
Because all group and consultation communication in our experiment is mediated by
an electronic chat protocol that stores all messages, we can also use content analysis to
investigate what drives risk-taking in our consultation and group treatments. We ﬁnd
that decisions made by groups involve more discussion and more eﬀective arguments for
expected earnings maximisation compared to choices of consulting individuals. These
results suggest that risk-taking in the two settings are motivated by diﬀerent consider-
ations.
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3.2 Related literature
Peer eﬀects have been observed in a wide array of choices under uncertainty, including
saving and investment decisions (Kelly & Grada, 2000; Duﬂo & Saez, 2003; Hong et al.,
2004; Brown et al., 2008), use of credit cards (Sotiropoulos & D’astous, 2012), criminal
activity (Fergusson et al., 2002; Bayer et al., 2009), drug and alcohol use (Fergusson
et al., 2002; Duncan et al., 2005; Powell et al., 2005; Lundborg, 2006; Clark & Lohéac,
2007). Compared to the long history of empirical and ﬁeld studies, the use of laboratory
experiments to identify peer eﬀects is a recent development. Experiments have shown
the existence of peer eﬀects in labour productivity experiments (Falk & Ichino, 2006;
Mas & Moretti, 2009; Bellemare et al., 2010) and eﬀort provision in gift-exchange games
(Thöni & Gächter, 2011; Gächter et al., 2012a,b).
There is also some experimental evidence of peer eﬀects on individual decisions under
risk. Yechiam et al. (2008) let subjects make binary choices under risk on a computer
while looking at a real-time broadcast from another subject’s choice screen, thus ex-
posing subjects to each other’s choices and outcomes. The authors report that mutual
observation in pairs leads to higher risk- taking, but this eﬀect is not observed if only
one of the subjects in the pair observes the other. Cooper & Rege (2011) test for peer
eﬀects in a series of binary choices under risk and ambiguity, using feedback about
other subjects’ choices as the channel for peer inﬂuence. They ﬁnd that subjects are
signiﬁcantly more likely to change their response if it deviates from the majority choice
of peers. Cooper & Rege also report that the peer inﬂuences of the majority opinion
spills over into other gambles: if subjects observe the majority of their peers choosing
the risky option in one choice, this makes them more likely to choose the risky option
in other choices. Finally, the authors show that the peer eﬀects are consistent with a
model of social regret, the idea that obtaining a poor outcome from a gamble does not
hurt as much if others have chosen the same gamble.
There are two reasons why subjects might be inﬂuenced by their peers in our experiment
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(for a broader review of social inﬂuence mechanisms, see Cialdini & Goldstein (2004).
The ﬁrst reason is social learning: people believe that their peers’ choices are based on
better information or superior cognitive appraisal of the decision to be made. The sec-
ond reason is social utility: people derive positive utility from choosing the same action
as their peers. Both of these mechanisms can operate at the conscious or sub-conscious
level of decision making. In a ﬁeld experiment facilitated by a Brazilian brokerage ﬁrm,
Bursztyn et al. (2012) ﬁnd that the percentage of investors participating in a certain
investment increases from 42% to 71% if they learn that another investor, with whom
they have been randomly paired, has expressed a wish to invest. If the investor they are
paired with actually participates, this percentage increases further to 93%. Bursztyn
et al. interpret their results as providing evidence that peer eﬀects in their experiment
are comprised of both social learning (knowledge that a peer investor would invest in
the same asset) and social utility (knowledge that a peer investor has actually invested
in the same asset).
3.2.1 Advice
Direct communication between subjects has been investigated in a number of exper-
imental studies. Schotter (2003) reviews experiments in which subjects receive rec-
ommendations from peers that have faced the same task. He presents evidence that
advice changes behaviour in ultimatum games (Schotter & Sopher, 2007), coordination
games (Schotter & Sopher, 2003) and sequential guessing games (Çelen et al., 2010).
The latter study also contains the striking result that subjects are more likely to follow
another’s recommendation rather than copy their action, although both variables have
the same informational value. Chaudhuri et al. (2006) present evidence that advice
leads to higher contributions and less free- riding in a public goods game. Kocher et al.
(2009) ﬁnd that receiving advice from peers in a beauty contest game is more eﬀective
than observational learning for improving performance. Schotter (2003) claims that ad-
vice increases eﬃciency or rationality because “the process of giving or receiving advice
forces decision-makers to think about the problem they are facing diﬀerent from the way
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they would do if no advice were oﬀered.” The possibility of our consultation treatment
having such an eﬀect is particularly intriguing. Previous experimental results with our
experimental set-up have indicated that groups take more risk than individuals, and
that discussion of the higher expected earnings associated with risk-taking is an impor-
tant factor behind the increased risk-taking (Sutter, 2007, 2009).
The advice in the studies cited above is intergenerational and incentivised. Subjects
playing in period t give advice to subjects playing in period t+1, and advisors receive an
additional pay-oﬀ that depends on the performance of their advisee. In our experiment,
we do not incentivise giving advice. There is some evidence that unincentivised peer ad-
vice works in the laboratory, but also some results that suggest that incentives matter.
Charness et al. (2010) report that subjects perform signiﬁcantly better in a probability
reasoning task after they discuss the task with fellow subjects. In an experiment with
choice under ambiguity, Keck et al. (2012) present evidence that individual choices be-
come more ambiguity-neutral after subjects discuss the experimental task in a group.
In a similar experiment, Charness et al. (2012) also ﬁnd that consultation increases
the percentage of ambiguity-neutral choices by individuals; the authors claim this is
due to ambiguity-neutral subjects possessing a “persuasive edge” over others (Charness
et al., 2012, p. 14). The authors also report that the eﬀect of consultation on choices
is stronger when subjects in a consulting pair are incentivised for each other’s choices.
3.3 The experiment
In all our treatments we use the investment task introduced by Gneezy & Potters (1997).
The decision-maker receives an endowment of 100 pence and chooses how much to invest
in a risky asset. With probability 2/3 the asset bears a zero return, and the decision-
maker earns that part of her endowment that was not invested. With probability 1/3 the
asset returns 3.5 times the investment, and so the decision-maker earns her endowment
plus 2.5 times her investment. That is, if the decision-maker invests x her earnings in
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a round are given by
• 100− x pence with probability 2
3
• 100− x+ 3.5x = 100 + 2.5x pence with probability 1
3
This task is repeated over nine rounds, with the asset returns determined by indepen-
dent draws at the end of each round (using a computerised random number generator).
An expected earnings maximizing (risk-neutral) decision-maker would invest the full
endowment (x = 100), yielding expected earnings of £1.17 in every round. More gen-
erally, expected earnings are strictly increasing in x. The amount invested in the risky
asset is used as a measure of risk-taking.
3.3.1 Treatments
Our experimental design comprises four treatments: one treatment where isolated in-
dividuals make choices under risk (IND), one treatment with group choices (GRP) and
two treatments with individual choice after consultation (CONS1 and CONS2). Treat-
ments IND and GRP are replications of Sutter (2009); treatments CONS1 and CONS2
are novel treatments. To allow for a faithful replication of the results of Sutter (2009),
we used his instructions, software, experimental parameters and incentive structure for
the IND and GRP treatments, and used these as the basis for the new consultation
treatments.2
2Instructions were taken from the English translations provided in the original paper. The software
was a set of a Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) treatment ﬁles, downloaded from the journal website at
http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec09/20080341_data.zip and translated to English. There is one
technical diﬀerence between Sutter’s original software implementation and ours: whereas the original
experiment uses separate chat software, we use the built-in electronic chat function of Z-Tree (version
3.3.8). Regarding incentives, we eﬀectively replace the e-sign with a £-sign for our two payment
variables: the show-up fee (e2 → £2) and round endowment (e1 → £1). This means that incentives
in our experiment are higher. Using the Economist’s ’Big Mac index’ (http://www.bigmacindex.org)
as a proxy for PPP, we estimate that the purchasing power of £1 in 2012 is 25% higher than e1 in
2008.
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In treatment IND subjects are not allowed to communicate with each other and they do
not receive feedback about others’ choices during or after the experiment. In treatment
GRP, groups of three subjects are randomly formed at the start of the experiment.
Group composition is ﬁxed for the whole experiment. In each round, group members
can use an on-screen electronic chat to arrive at a consensus decision for the amount x.
At any point during the chat, group members can submit a consensus decision by each
entering the same amount x on their decision screens. If the values of x submitted by
the three members are not the same, there is no consensus choice for the round and all
group members receive nothing.3
As in treatment GRP, subjects in treatments CONS1 and CONS2 are randomly as-
signed to groups of three subjects that stay together for the whole experiment. The
decision screen in treatments CONS1 and CONS2 also features an electronic chat be-
tween the group members, but the chat is used for consultation instead of reaching a
consensus. This means that subjects in the same consultation group are not required to
agree with others’ choices, or even participate in the chat. We thus have an individual
decision-making structure, plus consultation. At the end of the round, each subject
sees a feedback screen reminding them of their own choice and informing them of their
own earnings (as in IND). Subjects in treatment CONS2 are also shown a second feed-
back screen, which displays the choices and round earnings of all three members of
their consultation group. Thus the diﬀerence between consultation treatments lies in
the feedback received on the choices and earnings of other members of the consultation
group. CONS1 is more similar to the IND benchmark treatment, in that it gives no
information on the earnings and choices of others, and simply adds consultation, while
CONS2 is more like the GRP benchmark treatment, in that it gives this information
about other group members, and simply removes the group consensus feature.
3The same tie-breaking rule was used in Sutter (2009), and it is very eﬀective in motivating subjects
to reach consensus. Only 6 out of 378 decisions in our treatment GRP failed to produce a consensus
decision, and never more than once per group. In each of these 6 cases, two group members agreed
on the group choice but the third member submitted a diﬀerent value. We use the majority choice as
the data point in these cases, noting that our results are not aﬀected by excluding these observations.
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3.3.2 Procedures
All experimental sessions were carried out in a computerised laboratory. We used
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to recruit our subjects. Subjects were (mostly undergradu-
ate) students from various disciplines, who had previously registered for participation
in economic experiments. Altogether, 462 subjects took part in the experiment: 69 par-
ticipated in treatment IND, 144 (48 groups of 3) participated in treatment GRP, 126
(42 groups of 3) participated in treatment CONS1 and 123 (41 groups of 3) participated
in treatment CONS2.
In all treatments subjects sit at computer terminals separated by dividers and are not
allowed to communicate with one another (except through the experimental software in
the relevant treatments). Subjects are given instructions (reproduced in the appendix
to this chapter) that are read aloud. Subjects then make decisions over nine rounds,
with the results of the lottery, their resulting round earnings, and accumulated earnings
up to and including the current round given in a feedback screen at the end of each
round. Subjects in CONS2 also received an additional feedback screen displaying the
choices and earnings of other group members at the end of each round.
To resolve the lottery we assigned each individual/group a type at the beginning of the
session, with equal numbers of subjects given each of the three possible types: type 1,
2, and 3. At the end of each round subjects of one given type were successful in the
lottery, depending on the realisation of a computerised random number draw. In the
consultation treatments all members of a consultation group had the same type, and
thus either all members of a consultation group received a zero return on their individual
investments, or all members received the positive return. Thus, the consultation treat-
ments are similar to the group treatment, except that members of consulting groups
make individual decisions.
After the ﬁnal round, subjects complete a questionnaire and are paid. Each subject is
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Table 3.1: Percentage of endowment invested
IND (n=69)
GRP
(n=48)
CONS1
(n=42)
CONS2
(n=41)
All rounds (xR1−9) 39.7 51.3** 41.4 41.6
Rounds 1-3 (xR1−3) 39.3 48.7** 38.9 40.2
Rounds 4-6 (xR4−6) 42.4 51.8* 40.5 39.0
Rounds 7-9 (xR7−9) 37.3 53.5** 44.8* 45.4*
Asterisks denote signiﬁcant diﬀerences from treatment IND at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***)
level, based on two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests. For IND the unit of observation is the individual.
For GRP we take the consensus decision agreed by all group members. For the consultation treatments
we take the average choice of the three group members as the unit of observation.
paid their full earnings for all nine rounds, plus a show-up fee of £2. Average subject
earnings (including a show-up fee) were £11.71, with an average session time of 35 min-
utes.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Average investment levels
Table 3.4.1 lists average investment in all treatments, averaged over all 9 rounds and
also reported in blocks of three rounds, as Sutter (2009) does for his individuals and
group treatments. Pair-wise comparisons between the IND and GRP treatments reject
the null hypothesis of equal distributions, whether we focus on the average across all
rounds or the average in three-round blocks. This replicates Sutter’s group eﬀect: risk-
taking is higher in groups than among isolated individuals.
As noted in the previous section, CONS1 is identical to the IND treatment, except
that it allows for direct communication within consultation groups. We ﬁnd that the
opportunity to communicate directly with others in a similar position has a very weak
eﬀect on average risk-taking, with a signiﬁcant eﬀect only in the last three rounds. As
discussed above, previous experiments have shown risk-taking to be sensitive to whether
subjects observed others’ choices and earnings, and so we also conducted a consultation
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treatment in which an additional feedback screen informed subjects of all choices and
earnings within the consultation group (CONS2). Still, we observe signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between average investments in IND and CONS2 only in the last three rounds.
In fact, average investments are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between CONS1 and CONS2
(p > 0.100 in any comparison).
3.4.2 Within-group variability
By design, subjects in the IND treatment cannot inﬂuence one another’s choices. Pre-
sumably their decisions reﬂect their own personal perceptions of the decision task and
their individual risk attitudes. At the other extreme, in the GRP treatment there are
strong incentives for groups to reach consensus decisions. Thus, it may not be surprising
if individuals submit choices that conﬂict with their own risk preferences, since consen-
sus will very likely require compromise. What about the consultation treatments? Here
subjects are free to make the same kind of choices they would make were they isolated
individuals, but at the same time they may be inﬂuenced by the messages sent by other
subjects, or, in CONS2, by the actual choices and earnings of other members of their
consultative group.
Although we ﬁnd that consultation has a weak eﬀect on the average level of risk- taking,
we do ﬁnd evidence that consultation inﬂuences other aspects of behavior. Taking each
subject’s average investment across the nine rounds as the dependent variable, we run
a simple OLS regression on group dummies. The group dummies are jointly signiﬁcant
in both consultation treatments (CONS1: F(41, 84) = 2.63, p = 0.000; CONS2: F(40,
82) = 1.94, p = 0.006). The explanatory power of group dummies reﬂects the fact that
the decisions of members of a consultative group are more similar than the decisions of
isolated individuals.
For a non-parametric approach we apply Fisher’s randomisation technique to the av-
erage within-group standard deviation of average investments. First, we compute the
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within- group standard deviation (WGSD) of the individual averages for each consul-
tation group. To illustrate the bounds for WGSD, consider a consultation group where
two members invest zero in each round and a third member invests 100 in each round.
The average investment in this group is 33 and the WGSD is
WGSD(0, 0, 100) =
√
(33 1
3
− 0)2 + (33 1
3
− 0)2 + (33 1
3
− 100)2
n− 1
=
√
10000
9
+ 10000
9
+ 40000
9
2
≈ 57.7
We then took the average WGSD in our consultation treatments (19.4 in CONS1;
20.8 in CONS2) and compared it to the distribution of test statistics generated using
Fisher’s randomisation procedure.4 For both treatments we reject the null hypothesis
that WGSD in the consultation groups is from the same distribution as that of ran-
domly formed three-person groups without interaction (CONS1: p = 0.001; CONS2:
p = 0.000). We thus ﬁnd that consultation leads to signiﬁcantly lower variability of
investments between the three members of a consultation group, providing strong evi-
dence that individuals do not choose independently of one another after consultation.
One possible mechanism behind this peer eﬀect is that intra-group correlation devel-
ops across rounds, perhaps as a result of common shocks in the lottery outcomes.5 To
control for this possibility we consider choices from the ﬁrst round only. Since the only
diﬀerence between the consultation treatments is the feedback at the end of a round,
we pool the ﬁrst-round data from the two treatments. Group dummies are again signif-
icant in a regression of individual investments (F(82, 166) = 1.31, p = 0.075), and the
randomisation test again detects signiﬁcant within-group correlation (average WGSD
= 22.7, p = 0.029 ). If we exclude the 47 consultation groups that do not chat in
round one the eﬀect is even stronger (F(35, 72) = 1.70, p = 0.030; average WGSD =
4We drew 100,000 samples of individual averages from the empirical distribution, randomly assign-
ing individuals to groups and counting the proportion of statistics exceeding the observed statistic.
More details on the properties of this statistical procedure, as well as comparisons to commonly used
parametric and non-parametric techniques, can be found in Moir (1998).
5Recall, in order to enhance comparability between our consultation and group treatments all consul-
tation group members were of the same type and so the return on investment was either zero for all
members of a consultation group or positive for all members.
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20.8, p = 0.001). Thus, communication within consultation groups leads to a degree of
convergence in risk-taking decisions even in the initial round.
3.4.3 Communication content analysis
Communication within groups has very diﬀerent eﬀects on levels of risk-taking in the
group and consultation treatments. To gain an understanding of why this is so, we
examine the messages sent via the electronic chat communication. Two trained research
assistants assigned individual chat lines to one or more of the following categories:
• Amount. A suggestion of investment amount x (or range of values) for the
current round.
• Cautious. A statement that signals the individual’s preference to take less risk
by decreasing x.
• Emotive. A message indicating an emotional response to events in the experi-
ment.
• EV. Calculations of expected value for values of x.
• Off-topic. A message that does not relate to the experimental task.
• Risky. A statement that signals the individual’s preference to take more risk by
increasing x.
• Team building. A message referring to the group itself, individual group mem-
bers, its shared strategy or group members’ common fate.
Our research assistants received the same instructions but worked independently. Their
assignments of statements to categories were cross-checked for validity by calculating
Cohen’s Kappa coeﬃcient (Cohen, 1960) for each category. A high Kappa coeﬃcient
indicates a high proportion of agreement between the two assistants’ category judg-
ments. Following Landis & Koch (1977), we employ a threshold Kappa value of 0.41,
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Table 3.2: Kappa values and average frequency (per group) for chat message categories.
Cohen’s Kappa Category frequency
Category
name Description GRP CONS1 CONS2 GRP CONS1 CONS2
Amount
Proposal of a speciﬁc
amount 0.857 0.926 0.905 17.1 3.1 2.8
Emotive Emotive response 0.859 0.938 0.859 14.0 3.8 2.8
EV Expected value 0.703 0.759 0.820 2.0 0.3 0.3
Cautious Appeal to take less risk 0.695 0.903 0.651 2.8 0.8 0.3
Oﬀ-topic Oﬀ-topic 0.898 0.904 0.847 6.9 5.3 2.9
Risky Appeal to take more risk 0.584 0.885 0.721 3.2 0.8 0.4
Teambuilding
Reference to group iden-
tity 0.658 0.877 0.825 5.0 3.6 1.8
Average number of messages sent per group 161.0 49.6 36.7
indicating at least moderate agreement between our research assistants. Table 3.2 shows
the treatment-speciﬁc Kappa values for each category, as well as the average number
of times a message in the category was sent in a group. We see that all of our content
categories exceed the threshold Kappa value of 0.41. For each category, we report the
number of messages in that category sent per group.6
Note that there are considerably fewer messages sent in the consultation treatments
compared to the GRP treatment. This is not too surprising given that groups had to
ﬁnd a consensus decision in the GRP treatment. Note also that fewer messages are sent
in the CONS2 treatment than the CONS1 treatment.
To examine how the content of messages inﬂuenced average investment we use a Tobit
regression where the dependent variable is the average investment in a group and with
the average number of messages in each category as explanatory variables.7 The results
are reported in Table 3.3.
Coeﬃcients for message categories Risky and Cautious have the signs one would ex-
pect: Risky is positively correlated with investment (although not signiﬁcantly in GRP
or CONS1), and Cautious is negatively correlated with investment. The coeﬃcients
6A chat message belongs to a category if it was coded as such by at least one of our research assistants.
7he regression models were also estimated with dummies for group composition demographics (age,
gender, and number of economics/business students). These variables were always insigniﬁcant and
do not aﬀect our results.
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Table 3.3: Tobit regression of average investment on content variables
(GRP) (CONS1) (CONS2)
- amount 0.922 1.560 0.112
(1.046) (0.934) (0.665)
- cautious -4.801∗∗∗ -5.660∗ -5.650∗∗
(1.768) (2.921) (2.687)
- emotive 0.814∗ 1.020 0.624
(0.484) (0.803) (0.474)
- ev 4.164∗∗∗ 2.004 6.183∗
(1.468) (1.870) (3.438)
- risky 0.617 0.843 6.722∗
(1.402) (2.455) (3.423)
- oﬀtopic 0.443 0.0112 -0.680
(0.265) (0.152) (0.436)
- teambuilding -0.739 -0.330 -1.330
(0.733) (0.713) (1.143)
Number of observations 48 42 41
Prob > χ2 0.00123 0.0491 0.0303
Pseudo R2 0.0548 0.0386 0.0437
Standard errors in parentheses, asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗) and 1% (∗∗∗)
level. Table contains Tobit model regression results (lower bound: 0, upper bound: 100) of a group
(treatment GRP) or 3 consulting individuals (treatments CONS1 and CONS2) on content analysis
variables. Content analysis variables represent the count of the messages in the named category
exchanged between the 3 members over all rounds of the experiment.
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on EV are positive and, except for CONS1, signiﬁcant: more messages referring to ex-
pected value in any round are associated with higher investment. This result is in line
with the hypothesis that higher investment by groups is associated with expected value
maximisation, as observed in the communication data evidence presented by Sutter
(2009). The lack of an eﬀect of consultation on levels of risk-taking may be because
discussion of expected value has a weaker eﬀect than in the GRP treatment (note that
the coeﬃcient is smaller and insigniﬁcant in CONS1, and although higher in CONS2 the
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant only at the 10% signiﬁcance level), or it may be simply because
there is less discussion of expected value (see Table 3.2).
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
Using a simple investment task we compare choices under risk by three types of decision-
maker: isolated individuals, groups, and individuals who can consult each other. In line
with previous research using the same investment task (Sutter, 2009), we ﬁnd that
groups take more risk than individuals. When individuals can consult one another we
ﬁnd that communication among peers leads to signiﬁcant correlation of decisions within
the consultation group. However, consultation has a relatively weak eﬀect on the level of
risk-taking. Average risk-taking in our consultation treatment is similar to the average
risk-taking of isolated individuals. This underlines the importance of pay-oﬀ common-
ality for the increased level of risk-taking observed in group decisions.
Although consultation groups can discuss the task in the same way as group decision-
makers, content analysis reveals some important diﬀerences between treatments. Per-
haps most importantly, subjects in the consultation treatment exchange fewer messages
than in the group treatment, including messages discussing expected values. This may
explain why consultation fails to increase average investment, since mentions of ex-
pected value have a strong eﬀect on average investment in the group treatment. These
results suggest that having to make a group decision under risk is quite diﬀerent from
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giving people the opportunity to communicate with peers. Pay-oﬀ commonality within
groups leads to a diﬀerent discussion and decision-making process.
Our consultation treatments were designed to isolate the eﬀect of unincentivised com-
munication between peers. If subjects had been ﬁnancially motivated to provide others
with investment advice - for example, if they had been paid a percentage of others’
earnings - it is plausible that consultation would have a stronger eﬀect on the level of
investment. Similarly, we chose not to direct subjects to use communication in any
particular way. If we had made it mandatory for subjects to justify their choice to their
peers, this might induce them to think diﬀerently about the task (and perhaps about the
expected value of their choices), and may have resulted in a higher level of investment.
Thus, our ﬁnding that consultation does not translate into higher levels of investment
than are made by isolated individuals may reﬂect particular features of our design. Nev-
ertheless, it is notable that even in our relatively simple consultation setting subjects’
decisions are inﬂuenced by their peers, as evidenced by the convergence of investment
decisions within consultation groups. Further investigation of how features of the social
setting inﬂuence risk-taking among peers seem a promising direction for future research.
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions
Treatment IND
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round you will receive an endowment
of 100 pence (1 pound). You must decide which part of this endowment (between 0
pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will be denoted
as amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your
pay-oﬀ in the respective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 - X pence
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you
have invested in addition to your initial endowment and your pay-oﬀ in the re-
spective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 + 2.5X pence
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the
uniformly distributed interval [0, 3] and on your type. There are three possible types:
type 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type, which remains
ﬁxed for all 9 rounds.
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1]
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2]
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3]
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment
and it will be independently drawn anew in each consecutive round. After all individu-
als have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of the random
number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round, about your
round pay-oﬀ and your accumulated pay-oﬀ in the whole experiment. For your ﬁnal
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earnings, we will add up your pay-oﬀs in all 9 rounds.
In each round, you have 3 minutes to submit your decision. Please do not communicate
with other subjects at any point during the experiment. Anybody found in breach of
this rule will be dismissed without payment.
Treatment GRP
At the start of this experiment, you will be randomly matched with two other individ-
uals in the room to form a team of three. Team members will remain anonymous âĂŞ
no-one will ﬁnd out who their fellow team members are during or after the experiment.
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round your team will receive an endow-
ment of 100 pence (1 pound). Your team must decide which part of this endowment
(between 0 pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will
be denoted as amount X. Within your team, you have to agree on a single choice of the
amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your
pay-oﬀ in the respective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 - X pence
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you
have invested in addition to your initial endowment and your pay-oﬀ in the re-
spective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 + 2.5X pence
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the
uniformly distributed interval [0, 3] and on your type. There are three possible types:
type 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type, which remains
ﬁxed for all 9 rounds.
50
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1]
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2]
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3]
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment
and it will be independently drawn anew in each consecutive round. After all teams
have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of the random
number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round, about your
round pay-oﬀ and your accumulated pay-oﬀs up to and including that round. For your
ﬁnal earnings, we will add up your pay-oﬀs in all 9 rounds. Please note that each single
member of a team will be paid the full earnings, which, of course, are identical for all
team members.
Within your team, you and the other members have to agree on the amount X in each
round. In order to reach agreement, you can communicate with the two other subjects
via an electronic chat which will appear on your computer screen. If you have agreed on
an amount X, please enter the amount on your input screen and conﬁrm your entry. If
the three members of your team do not enter the same amount X then all team members
will earn zero in this round.
It is forbidden to send any message that might reveal your identity to the other team
members. If you violate this rule you will not receive any payment.
Treatments CONS1 and CONS2
Note: the sentence in italics only applies to treatment CONS2.
At the start of this experiment, you will be randomly matched with two other individu-
als in the room to form a group of three. Group members will remain anonymous âĂŞ
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no-one will ﬁnd out who their fellow group members are during or after the experiment.
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round you will receive an endowment
of 100 pence (1 pound). You must decide which part of this endowment (between 0
pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will be denoted
as amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your
pay-oﬀ in the respective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 - X pence
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you
have invested in addition to your initial endowment and your pay-oﬀ in the re-
spective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 + 2.5X pence
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the
uniformly distributed interval [0, 3] and on your type. There are three possible types:
type 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type, which remains
ﬁxed for all 9 rounds.
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1]
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2]
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3]
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment
and it will be independently drawn anew in each consecutive round. After all individu-
als have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of the random
number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round, about your
round pay-oﬀ and your accumulated pay-oﬀs up to and including that round. You will
also see a summary screen that shows the earnings of the other members of your group
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in the current round. For your ﬁnal earnings, we will add up your pay-oﬀs in all 9 rounds.
Within your group, each individual member can choose a diﬀerent amount X in each
round. Your earnings do not depend on the choices of the other group members. Before
you enter your amount X, you can communicate with the two other subjects via an
electronic chat which will appear on your computer screen. You are free to consult with
them and discuss any aspect of the experiment. However, it is forbidden to send any
message that might reveal your identity to the other group members. If you violate this
rule you will not receive any payment.
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Appendix B: Experimental software screenshots
Figure 3.1: Treatment IND decision screen
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Figure 3.2: Treatment GRP chat and decision screen
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Figure 3.3: Treatment CONS1 and CONS2 chat and decision screen
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Figure 3.4: Treatment CONS2 consultation group feedback screen
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Chapter 4
Group diversity, communication
and risk taking
4.1 Introduction
Decision making groups at many levels of society are becoming increasingly diverse.
Within country borders, this process is embodied by the emancipation of women and
ethnic minorities, which has given these previously marginalised groups better oppor-
tunities in the labour market and greater inﬂuence in the political process. Another
source of diversity is increased international cooperation and economic integration, as
personiﬁed by the ubiquity of organisations with a multinational workforce. Diversity
is not only viewed as a good thing in itself, but many claim it also leads to better
decisions:
The problem of risk comes down to diversity (...) If you cut everybody in
your own mould in the same business, then you don’t have enough pressure
on the questions of “Why?”, “What are the benefits?” and “What are the
risks?”
—Karren Brady, Executive, former UK Business Woman of the Year
(Private Business, 2011)
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Empirical researchers have sought to substantiate such claims by investigating the ef-
fect of diversity on decisions of real world groups, such as management teams (Bantel
& Jackson, 1989; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Boeker, 1997;
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). We complement the empirical literature on management
teams by investigating the eﬀect of group diversity on decisions under risk in a con-
trolled, abstract lottery task. We are interested in the eﬀect of international diversity
on outcomes of face-to-face discussions, as organisational theory and empirical evidence
to date suggests that more culturally diverse groups are more risk averse (Watson &
Kumar, 1992; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). Contrary to the picture painted by the lit-
erature so far, we ﬁnd no evidence that international diversity signiﬁcantly changes
risk-taking by groups. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the gender composition of groups is
a much stronger, and statistically signiﬁcant, determinant of group risk-taking. Our
results are similar to those reported by Bogan et al. (2011), with the diﬀerence that
risk aversion in our experimental setting is strictly increasing in the number of female
group members. Finally, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of gender composition is equally strong
if subjects communicate by anonymous electronic chat. This result suggests that our
gender composition eﬀect is not caused by group members trying to live up to gender
stereotypes in face-to-face encounters, but are driven by a more general tendency of
groups with more female members to be more risk averse.
This chapter makes two contributions to the literature. First, we present evidence of a
controlled and incentivised experimental test of the eﬀect of international diversity on
group decisions under risk. Our laboratory experiment with random group formation,
in contrast to empirical studies, controls for any confounding factors that simultane-
ously aﬀect group composition and its members’ propensity to take risk. The fact that,
contrary to the empirical literature, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of international diversity might
suggest that such unobserved factors, such as company culture, play an important role
in the ﬁeld. Alternatively, it could be that the empirical observations of the negative
relationship between cultural diversity and risk-taking depend on certain parameters of
a decision problem, which are absent from our controlled laboratory setting. Finding
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out which parameters moderate the eﬀect of cultural diversity seems a promising ques-
tion for further research. Second, we conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings on the eﬀect of gender
composition on group decisions under risk in a context-free setting. Since decisions
in our experimental design are not framed as representing risk-taking in a particular
domain (e.g. stock market investment, international business expansion), our results
cannot be explained by a gender diﬀerence in familiarity or suitability for a particular
choice domain. Furthermore, we establish that the gender composition eﬀect is robust
to changes in the communication protocol used by the group.
4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 Individual demographics and risk
Experiments have shown that people’s risk attitudes are correlated with various de-
mographic characteristics, such as gender, age, and ethnicity. One of the more robust
ﬁndings is the relationship between risk-taking and gender: many laboratory studies
report that women are generally more risk averse than men (Eckel & Grossman, 2008;
Croson & Gneezy, 2009). More speciﬁcally, Charness & Gneezy (2012) review the data
from experiments with the same fundamental design as ours (based on the investment
task from Gneezy & Potters, 1997) and conclude that women invest signiﬁcantly lower
amounts than men in a risky asset. Gender diﬀerences in risk-taking have also been
found outside the laboratory: Barber & Odean (2001) ﬁnd that female clients of a
brokerage ﬁrm hold less risky portfolios than male clients. Second, empirical and labo-
ratory evidence suggests a link between risk-taking and age, with a number of studies
reporting that risk aversion increases as people get older (Otani et al., 1992; Grasmick
et al., 1996; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005).
A number of studies suggest that risk-taking might be related to people’s ethnic and
cultural background. Barsky et al. (1997) report that, based on hypothetical choices
on high-stakes income gambles from the 1992 US Health and Retirement Survey, white
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Americans are more risk averse than other ethnicities, and that Asian and Hispanic
Americans are more risk seeking than other ethnicities. Using 1992-2002 data from the
Health and Retirement Survey, Sahm (2007) reports that black Americans are 28% more
likely to accept a high-stake income gamble than white Americans. Furthermore, both
Barsky et al. and Sahm ﬁnd that hypothetical risk-taking in the survey is positively
correlated with risky activities such as smoking, drinking, self-employment and stock
market participation.
Other experimental studies examine diﬀerences in risk-taking between people from dif-
ferent cultures. Hsee & Weber (1999) ﬁnd that Chinese students are more risk seeking
in hypothetical scenarios than American students in the domain of stock market in-
vestment. Lau & Ranyard (2005) also report that (Hong Kong) Chinese subjects are
more risk seeking than British subjects in a hypothetical gambling task, Fong & Wyer
(2003) present conﬂicting evidence, however, with (Hong Kong) Chinese and American
students being equally risk seeking in stock market investment choices, and Americans
more risk seeking in the domain of academic achievement.
4.2.2 Diversity
The eﬀect of group diversity on decisions with an element of risk has been studied ex-
tensively in the empirical literature on top management performance (see Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Nielsen, 2010). Bantel & Jackson
(1989) look at the eﬀect of diversity in banks’ management teams on one type of en-
trepreneural risk: product innovation. They ﬁnd that banks headed by managers from
diverse functional backgrounds are more innovative, but that diversity in age, team
tenure length and education are not correlated with innovation. Barkema & Shvyrkov
(2007) ﬁnd a seemingly diﬀerent, but related eﬀect of management team diversity on
Dutch companies’ foreign direct investment (FDI). The authors report that diversity in
team tenure length is positively associated with more FDI, but note that team tenure
length is also strongly related to managers’ recent functional background. Finally, a
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number of studies look at the eﬀect of top management team demographics on the
likelihood of a change in corporate strategy. Wiersema & Bantel (1992) report that
strategic change is more likely to originate with management teams with a lower aver-
age age, shorter organisation tenure length, higher team tenure length, more educational
diversity, and higher levels of education and academic training. Boeker (1997) ﬁnds that
higher team tenure length and higher within-team diversity in team tenure length are
associated with a higher likelihood of a change in corporate strategy.
Organisational researchers and theorists categorise sources of group diversity into in-
formational diversity, social category diversity, and value diversity (Jehn et al., 1999).
Informational diversity, which is typically measured by team members’ functional or
educational background, is thought to have a positive eﬀect on group performance by
widening the scope of the discussion through the provision of more task-relevant in-
formation. The studies cited above also suggest that informational diversity increases
groups’ propensity to take risky decisions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Wiersema & Bantel,
1992; Boeker, 1997; Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007). Social category and value diversity,
on the other hand, are thought to frustrate the group process by making it harder for
group members to relate to each other. Our main variable of interest, international
diversity, can be interpreted as both a dimension of social category diversity and of
value diversity. Group diversity theory would thus predict that more internationally
diverse groups are less eﬀective at communicating with each other, and these groups
might consequently feel less comfortable taking risks together. The empirical evidence
collected so far is consistent with this explanation. Nielsen & Nielsen (2011) report
that Swiss multi-national companies managed by more internationally diverse teams
are more likely to pursue geographic expansion through joint ventures than through
more risky full-control entities. In an experiment with participants from a management
training course, Watson & Kumar (1992) ﬁnd that culturally heterogeneous groups se-
lect less risky options than culturally homogeneous groups in hypothetical scenarios
involving risk.
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4.2.3 Group decisions under risk
Group decisions under risk have long been studied in experimental psychology (see My-
ers, 1982; Turner, 1991) but has recently seen renewed interest in the form of economic
experiments. In most of these experiments, groups of subjects are presented with a list
of choices between lotteries representing diﬀerent levels of risk over monetary pay-oﬀs.
Groups select one lottery, and each group member is paid the same amount after this
lottery is played out. The majority of these studies focus on how group risk-taking com-
pares with individuals, instead of comparing groups to other groups.1 To our knowledge,
only one experimental study compares risk-taking over real incentives in diﬀerent types
of groups. Bogan et al. (2011) investigate the eﬀect of gender composition of groups on
incentivised investment decisions. In contrast to our experiment, the decisions in Bogan
et al. are deliberately framed as representing the choices of an actual investment fund.
The investment decisions in the experiment are presented as binary choices between
stock portfolios with diﬀerent levels of risk over percentage returns, the realisation of
which is said to depend on actual stock price over time. Like actual investment fund
managers, subjects’ earnings are increasing in the realised percentage return on their
portfolios. Bogan et al. ﬁnd that groups’ propensity to chose a risky option is increased
by having a male in the group, but that risk-taking is not strictly increasing in the
number of males per group. The most risk-seeking groups in their experiment are dom-
inated by males, but not all male.
4.3 The experiment
Our experimental design contains two treatments: a treatment with group decisions
(GRP) and a treatment with individual choices under risk (IND). Both treatments are
1The experimental evidence from groups versus individual risk-taking studies is mixed, and suggests a
complicated relationship (if any) between individual and group decisions. Sutter (2009) and Zhang
& Casari (2010) report higher risk-taking by groups; Masclet et al. (2009) report lower risk-taking
by groups; Deck et al. (2010) report no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Both Shupp & Williams (2008) and
Baker et al. (2008) report that groups react more strongly than individuals to very low and very high
probabilities of winning.
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replications of the investment task reported in Sutter (2009), which is adapted from the
’myopic loss aversion’ experiments of Gneezy & Potters (1997). Our experiment diﬀers
in respect of the subject pool. Whereas the subject pool in Sutter (2009) was culturally
homogeneous, our subject pool is made up of students from various countries.2 We use
the investment task from Sutter (2009) because results show that groups consistently
take more risk than individuals in this task, and eﬀective group communication has been
shown to play an important role in this process (see chapter three of this thesis). We
thus consider increased risk-taking by groups as compared to individuals, controlling
for other factors, as an indication of the eﬀectiveness of group communication.
Both treatments implemented the following task, repeated over nine rounds. In round
t, the decision maker (group or individual) receives an endowment of 100 pence (£1).
The decision maker i can invest xit ∈ [0, 100] pence of this endowment in a lottery with
winning probability 1
3
. If the decision maker wins the lottery in round t, earnings are
3.5xit; if the decision maker loses the lottery, earnings are zero. Any money not invested
is kept, such that subject i’s earnings in round t are as follows:
• 100− xit pence with probability 23
• 100− xit + 3.5xit = 100 + 2.5xit pence with probability 13
If the decision maker is a group, these earnings are eﬀectively multiplied by three and
divided equally among the three group members. Subject earnings in each round are
thus the return on a safe asset (the money kept) plus the return on a risky asset (the
lottery outcome). The part x of the endowment invested in the risky asset measures
risk-taking. An expected earnings maximising (risk-neutral) subject would invest the
full endowment (x = 100), yielding expected earnings of £1.17 in every round. More
generally, expected earnings are strictly increasing in x.
After subjects submit their decisions, a computerised random number generator is used
2We learned about the subject pool demographics in Sutter (2009) through private correspondence
with the author.
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to resolve the lottery. Subjects are then presented with the results of the lottery and
their resulting round earnings on a summary screen. The summary screen also shows
the subjects’ accumulated earnings up to and including the current round.
After the ﬁnal round, subjects are asked to complete a questionnaire. After completing
the questionnaire, each subject is paid their full earnings for all nine rounds, plus a
show-up fee of £2, and subsequently dismissed. To allow for a faithful replication of
Sutter (2009), we used the same software, translated instructions, experimental param-
eters and incentive structure.3
Our main variable of analysis is the experiment average investment xi =
T∑
t=1
xit for a
particular group or individual, which we believe to be the most stable measure of risk-
taking in our task. Because xi varies between 0 and 100 in each round, the average of
this variable also corresponds to the percentage of the total endowment (9 rounds × £1
= £9) invested in the lottery during the experiment.
We are interested in the eﬀect of international diversity of groups of subjects on their
level of risk-taking. We measure the level of risk-taking in groups of diﬀerent national-
ity compositions, compared to baselines of strictly British nationals/native speakers. In
line with group diversity theory and previous empirical results, we expect that groups
with fewer British nationals/native speakers take less risk due to less eﬀective communi-
cation. It is important to note that, in our experimental task, eﬀective communication
has been shown to signiﬁcantly correlate with risk-taking: various experimental studies
report that increased risk-taking is positively related to communication about the lot-
tery’s expected value (Sutter, 2009, see also chapter three of this thesis).
3The original software is available at http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec09/20080341_data.zip as a Z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) treatment ﬁle; our translated instructions are included in the appendix to
this chapter.
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4.3.1 Treatments
In treatment GRP, groups of three subjects sit together behind one computer terminal
and have to submit a consensus choice of x. The experimenters provide no explicit
fall-back decision mechanism in case groups fail to reach consensus, so group members
have a strong incentive to agree on a common choice. Subjects can communicate with
fellow group members by speaking in a low voice, but they are speciﬁcally instructed
not to communicate with other groups. Groups are separated by cubicle dividers, such
that subjects cannot see members of other groups in the room.
In treatment IND, subjects sit at a computer terminal by themselves and submit indi-
vidual values of x. Subjects are not allowed to communicate, and subjects receive no
feedback about others’ choices during or after the experiment. Privacy is maintained
by experimenter oversight and cubicle dividers between computer terminals.
4.3.2 Procedure
All experimental sessions were carried out at the CeDEx computer laboratory at the
University of Nottingham (Nottingham, UK). We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to re-
cruit our subjects; altogether, 324 subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects
were (mostly undergraduate) students from various disciplines, who had previously reg-
istered for participation in economic experiments. Average subject earnings (including
a show-up fee of £2) were £11.82, with an average session time of 35 minutes. The
experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) version 3.3.8.
4.3.3 Subject demographics and recruitment
Table 4.3.3 summarises the demographics of our subjects, including our measures of
international diversity. Based on subjects’ nationality, we create two measures of inter-
national diversity. The ﬁrst measure is based on whether a subject is a British national;
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Table 4.1: Subject pool demographics
Treatment IND Treatment GRP
Average age 19.9 20.0
Male / female 38 / 31 109 / 146
University degree: economics or business / other 8 / 61 62 / 193
British / international 53 / 16 177 / 78
Native speakers / non-native speakers 56 / 13 188 / 67
All-male / majority male / majority female / all-
female 6 / 27 / 37 / 15
All-econ / majority econ / majority other / all-
other 3 / 12 / 29 / 41
All-British / majority British / majority int’l /
all-int’l 30 / 37 / 13 / 5
All-native / majority native / majority non-nat. /
all-non-nat. 34 / 37 / 12 / 2
Total (groups) 69 255 (85)
Subject pool demographics for the experiment, aggregated per treatment. All measures are
self-reported, with the exception of the native speaker variable.
the second measure is based on whether English is one of the oﬃcial languages in the
subject’s country of origin (CIA World Factbook, 2009).
The subject pool in both treatments are similar in terms of non-cultural demographics,
although we note that treatment GRP has more females and economics students. To
test our hypotheses about risk-taking in groups, we purposely recruited a greater per-
centage of non-British subjects for the GRP treatment, amounting to 31% of subjects
for that treatment. To avoid arousing suspicion among our subjects about targeted
recruitment of international students and its intended purpose, however, we always re-
cruited British nationals alongside international subjects for each session. To ensure
we gathered enough data on optimally communicating groups, we also ran some exper-
imental sessions with British subjects only; this explains the relatively high number of
all-British groups.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Group diversity and risk taking
To analyse group decisions for diﬀerent group compositions, we estimate two Tobit mod-
els of group average investment in treatment GRP on dummy variables for international
diversity, with all-British or all-native speaker groups as the baseline in the model. We
also estimate versions of the model with control variables for gender and university de-
gree (number of economics and business students) composition. We control for gender
because many previous experiments have shown a correlation between risk-taking and
gender, as discussed earlier. Second, because higher risk-taking in the investment task
has previously been associated with group communication about lottery expected value
(Sutter, 2009, see also chapter three of this thesis), it is plausible that groups with more
economics and business students would be more likely to choose higher investments.
We therefore include university degree dummy variables that measure the number of
economics and business students in a group.
The results of our Tobit regressions are shown in table 4.2. The results in the ﬁrst and
third column of the table show that internationally diverse groups invest, on average,
less than homogeneous groups, but that this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant for
any of the diverse group compositions. Furthermore, when we control for gender and
degree composition, the relationship between group diversity and risk-taking remains
insigniﬁcant. More important, the results show that gender composition has a much
stronger (and signiﬁcant) eﬀect than international diversity. Controlling for other de-
mographic factors, all-female groups and groups with a female majority invest around
35% less of their endowment than all-male groups. Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence that the
number of economics and business students in a group increases a group’s willingness
to take risk.
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Table 4.2: Tobit regression of groups’ average investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cultural diversity
Majority british -5.037 -6.692
(6.046) (5.695)
Majority foreign -3.571 0.215
(8.154) (7.807)
All foreign -6.519 3.407
(11.85) (12.31)
Majority native speakers -3.123 -3.816
(5.840) (5.496)
Majority non-native speakers -5.415 1.100
(8.237) (8.099)
All non-native speakers -13.66 -9.385
(17.84) (16.57)
Gender
Majority male -19.50∗ -18.10∗
(10.48) (10.45)
Majority female -35.85∗∗∗ -34.35∗∗∗
(10.23) (10.25)
All female -36.30∗∗∗ -36.07∗∗∗
(11.25) (11.29)
Degree
Majority economics -8.646 -4.036
(15.22) (14.72)
Majority other -1.089 -0.125
(13.59) (13.66)
All other 5.563 6.136
(13.47) (13.55)
Number of observations 85 85 85 85
Prob > χ2 0.849 0.0237 0.812 0.0328
Pseudo R2 0.00106 0.0252 0.00126 0.0239
Standard errors in parentheses, asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗) and 1% (∗∗∗)
level. Table contains Tobit model regression results (lower bound: 0, upper bound: 100) of a group’s
average investment over all 9 rounds on group demographic variables. Models 1 and 2 use number of
British nationals in a group as a measure of international diversity (dummy baseline: all British
groups). Models 3 and 4 use number of native speakers of the English language in a group as a
measure of international diversity (dummy baseline: all native speaker groups). Models 2 and 4
include controls for gender composition (dummy baseline: all male groups) and university degree
composition (dummy baseline: all economics/business studies groups).
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4.4.2 Demographics and individual risk-taking
To learn more about the interaction between individual characteristics and group mem-
bership, we investigate how demographic characteristics are correlated with individu-
als’ choices under risk in our task. Table 4.3 contains the results of a series of Tobit
regressions of individual average investment on dummy variables for non-British na-
tionality, East Asian nationality, non-native speaker, gender (female) and degree (eco-
nomics/business or other). The variable for East Asian nationality is to test for a
commonly held perception that Eastern cultures diﬀer from Western cultures in their
perception of risk (Weber & Hsee, 1998; Hsee & Weber, 1999).
The regression results in table 4.3 show that women invest signiﬁcantly less than men in
treatment IND, a result consistent with other studies with similar experimental designs
(Charness & Gneezy, 2012) and the literature on individual risk-taking at large (Eckel &
Grossman, 2008; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Controlling for diﬀerences in cultural back-
ground and degree, women invest about 18% less of their endowment than men. The
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms suggest that this eﬀect is stronger for international
or East Asian subjects, but this is not signiﬁcant. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence of
diﬀerent levels of risk-taking in non-British subjects, East Asians or non-native speak-
ers. We also ﬁnd no evidence of diﬀerences in individual subjects’ risk-taking due to
diﬀerences in culture or language ability.
Gender is signiﬁcantly correlated with risk-taking in both individuals and groups, but
a comparison between tables 4.2 and 4.3 shows that the eﬀect leads to a bigger risk-
taking diﬀerential in groups. At the most extreme end of the scale, we ﬁnd that all
male groups invest almost twice as much as all female groups in the risky asset (see
ﬁgure 4.1). The greater diﬀerential between groups could indicate polarisation of risk
attitudes: women become more risk-averse in the company of other women, and men
become more risk seeking in the company of other men. Such polarisation could cast
doubt on the ﬁndings that groups consistently invest more than individuals in the in-
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Table 4.3: Tobit regression of individuals’ average investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographic variables
Foreign nationality (non-British) -7.785 0.194
(8.375) (11.24)
Non-native speaker -0.479 -0.803
(9.342) (11.41)
East Asian nationality 0.0794 3.571
(11.65) (15.17)
Female -18.41∗∗∗ -14.73∗ -18.60∗∗∗ -17.81∗∗ -18.57∗∗∗ -19.32
(6.727) (7.528) (6.766) (7.108) (6.790) (16.69)
Other degree (non-economics/business) 10.80 13.09 14.46 14.64 14.67 14.73
(11.18) (11.32) (11.21) (11.20) (11.52) (11.58)
Interaction terms
Foreign × Female -16.91
(16.04)
Eastern × Female -7.956
(22.17)
Non-native × Female 0.901
(18.22)
Number of observations 69 69 69 69 69 69
Prob > χ2 0.0296 0.0391 0.0437 0.0830 0.0436 0.0873
Pseudo R2 0.0143 0.0161 0.0129 0.0132 0.0130 0.0130
Standard errors in parentheses, asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗) and 1% (∗∗∗)
level. Table contains Tobit model regression results (lower bound: 0, upper bound: 100) of a subject’s
average investment over all 9 rounds on demographic variables. Models 1 and 2 test for diﬀerences
due to not having British nationality, models 3 and 4 diﬀerences due to not being a native speaker,
model 5 and 6 test for diﬀerences due to being East Asian. All models include controls for gender and
university degree. Models 2, 4 and 6 include interaction terms between gender and measures of
nationality and native language.
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vestment task (Sutter, 2009, see also chapter three of this thesis). But our data on
gender composition, summarised in ﬁgure 4.1, actually shows that the result of higher
investment by groups still holds. All-female groups invest on average more of their
endowment (38.3%) than individual females (30.7%), although this diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test, p > 0.1). All-male groups
invest more (70%) than individual males (47%) - a diﬀerence signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.1). We thus ﬁnd that the result of higher
investment by groups reported in Sutter (2009) applies regardless of gender, and this
eﬀect is particularly strong in all-male groups.
Figure 4.1: Average investment by gender (composition)
Figure shows the average investment over all nine rounds of individuals (males and females separately)
and groups in the GRP treatment (grouped by gender composition).
4.4.3 Communication and group risk taking
As part of a related study on the same investment task (reported in chapter three of this
thesis), we carried out a group treatment in which subjects communicated by electronic
chat before making a choice (henceforth GRP-CHAT, n = 48). In the electronic chat,
group members were not allowed to reveal any personal information to fellow group
members. By comparing the data from treatment GRP-CHAT to treatment GRP, we
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Table 4.4: Tobit regression of average investment in diﬀerent group treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Gender composition
Majority male -24.18∗∗∗ -24.30∗∗∗ -19.08∗
(7.911) (7.937) (11.41)
Majority female -36.44∗∗∗ -36.65∗∗∗ -34.42∗∗∗
(7.797) (7.872) (11.15)
All female -35.66∗∗∗ -35.76∗∗∗ -35.60∗∗∗
(9.028) (9.043) (12.31)
Cultural diversity
Majority native speakers -4.313 -4.727 -4.458
(4.820) (5.278) (5.271)
Majority non-native speakers -1.217 -1.789 -1.133
(8.029) (8.559) (8.605)
All non-native speakers -10.77 -11.33 -12.28
(17.81) (18.05) (17.94)
Degree composition
Majority economics -4.228 -3.920 -2.429
(15.52) (15.60) (15.55)
Majority other 0.842 1.140 2.899
(14.70) (14.78) (14.76)
All other 1.524 1.764 3.284
(14.67) (14.72) (14.68)
Treatment variables and interaction terms
Subjects use electronic chat -0.985 3.869
(5.112) (14.12)
Chat × Majority male -11.14
(15.80)
Chat × Majority female -3.284
(15.65)
Chat × All-Female 3.593
(18.31)
Number of observations 133 133 133
Prob > χ2 0.00272 0.00485 0.0139
Pseudo R2 0.0211 0.0211 0.0222
Standard errors in parentheses, asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗) and 1% (∗∗∗)
level. Table contains Tobit model regression results (lower bound: 0, upper bound: 100) of a group’s
average investment over all 9 rounds on group demographic variables, for pooled data from the GRP
and GRP-CHAT treatments. All models use the number of native speakers of the English language in
a group as a measure of international diversity (dummy baseline: all native speaker groups), and
further control for gender composition (dummy baseline: all male groups) and university degree
composition (dummy baseline: all economics/business studies groups). Model 2 measures the pure
treatment eﬀect from using electronic chat instead of face-to-face communication; model 3 also
includes interaction terms between gender composition and electronic chat communication.
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can thus estimate the joint eﬀect of anonimity and electronic chat as a communication
medium (as compared to face-to-face communication). This allows us to check for cer-
tain stereotype eﬀects. It could be, for example, that predominantly male groups in
treatment GRP feel a pressure to conform to the stereotype of the risk-taking male; this
would not occur in GRP-CHAT as subjects do not know each other’s gender. There is
a large psychology literature on gender stereotypes and risk, and experimental studies
suggest that people typically predict that men are more risk-taking (Daruvala, 2007),
sometimes even over-estimating male risk attitudes and under-estimating female risk
attitudes (Siegrist et al., 2002; Roszkowski & Grable, 2005).
It might also be the case that subjects feel less comfortable taking risk in groups with
greater social distance between subjects. Experiments have found that communication
media with greater social distance (video conference, face-to-face conversation) gener-
ally lead to lower levels of cooperation in public goods games (Frohlich & Oppenheimer,
1998; Brosig et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006). Cooperation in public goods games de-
pends on subjects exposing themselves to risk: the social risk of being exploited by
free riders. The results in public goods games could therefore point to a more general
relationship between social distance and risk-taking: people are less willing to take risk
when social distance is greater. To look for evidence of the above hypotheses, we com-
bine data from treatments GRP and GRP-CHAT to estimate a Tobit regression model
of average investment on dummy variables for electronic chat, native speaker composi-
tion, gender composition and degree composition.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the Tobit regressions for communication medium eﬀects,
the third column also containing includes interaction terms between the communication
medium and gender composition. As before, gender composition coeﬃcients show that
majority female and all-female groups take signiﬁcantly less risk than all-male groups.
Also similar to the results presented earlier, international diversity and university de-
gree composition do not aﬀect risk-taking. More important, the results show that (i)
the communication medium does not aﬀect risk-taking, and (ii) the gender eﬀect is per-
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sistently signiﬁcant and unaﬀected by the communication medium. This is conﬁrmed
by an F-test of the model in the ﬁrst versus the third column, as the variable for elec-
tronic chat and its interaction terms with gender composition are jointly insigniﬁcant
(F (4, 114) = 0.59,p > 0.1). These results suggest that the diﬀerences in risk-taking in
groups with diﬀerent gender compositions are driven by a combination of subjects’ risk
attitudes and group communication, regardless of whether subjects know each other’s
gender. This evidence contradicts the notion that group decisions in our experiment
are driven by gender stereotypes, such as the view that men should take more risk than
women.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
We use a controlled experiment to investigate incentivised risk-taking by small groups
with varying degrees of international diversity. Contrary to evidence from empirical
studies on top management teams (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011) and unincentivised ex-
periments with hypothetical choices (Watson & Kumar, 1992), we ﬁnd that a group’s
international diversity does not aﬀect its risk-taking. Because higher risk-taking in our
investment task has previously been associated with discussion about achieving higher
expected value (Sutter, 2009, chapter three of this thesis), our results suggest that our
internationally diverse groups are just as eﬀective as homogeneous groups in increasing
their expected earnings through more risk-taking. We do, however, ﬁnd a strong eﬀect
of groups’ gender composition: the more females in a group, the more risk averse the
group decision. Compared to all female groups, all male groups invest almost twice as
much of their endowment in a risky asset.
The lack of a international diversity eﬀect should be viewed in the context of our exper-
iment. Our investment task is easy to comprehend and the arguments used to convince
fellow group members are arguably far simpler than those used in more complex group
decisions in the real world. It could be that a more diﬃcult task would have presented
75
our internationally diverse groups with more problems. Second, our subject pool con-
sists of university students that have all passed a language test to study at the Unversity
of Nottingham. Perhaps groups with greater cultural and language barriers would have
operated diﬀerently. On a related note, we would like to suggest another way of inter-
preting our results: barriers to cross-cultural communication will be less important in
the future than they are today. Our subject pool is comprised of students who study
and live in an environment with people of many nationalities, which presumably leads to
greater awareness of international diversity. If today’s students are better prepared for
culture and language diﬀerences, and if these diﬀerences are smaller due to students’ up-
bringing, education and common life experiences, communication will be more eﬀective.
The direction of our gender composition eﬀect is in line with the literature on gender
in individual risk-taking and the only other experimental study that looks at the eﬀect
of diversity on group decisions (Bogan et al., 2011). The relationship between gender
composition and risk-taking in our data is straightforward: risk-taking strictly increases
in the number of males in a group, with all-male groups the most risk seeking and all-
female groups the most risk averse. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of gender
composition is of the same magnitude when groups communicate by anonymous elec-
tronic chat through computer terminals. This result suggests that group decisions are
independent of the communication medium and are driven by group members’ own risk
attitudes, rather than stereotypical behaviour based on subjects’ perceptions of what
degree of risk-taking is appropriate for their gender.
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions
Treatment IND
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round you will receive an endowment
of 100 pence (1 pound). You must decide which part of this endowment (between 0
pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will be denoted
as amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your
pay-oﬀ in the respective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 - X pence
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you
have invested in addition to your initial endowment and your pay-oﬀ in the re-
spective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 + 2.5X pence
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the
uniformly distributed interval [0, 3] and on your type. There are three possible types:
type 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type, which remains
ﬁxed for all 9 rounds.
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1]
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2]
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3]
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment
and it will be independently drawn anew in each consecutive round. After all individu-
als have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of the random
number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round, about your
round pay-oﬀ and your accumulated pay-oﬀ in the whole experiment. For your ﬁnal
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earnings, we will add up your pay-oﬀs in all 9 rounds.
In each round, you have 3 minutes to submit your decision. Please do not communicate
with other subjects at any point during the experiment. Anybody found in breach of
this rule will be dismissed without payment.
Treatment GRP
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round your team will receive an endow-
ment of 100 pence (1 pound). Your team must decide which part of this endowment
(between 0 pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will
be denoted as amount X. Within your team, you have to agree on a single choice of the
amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your
pay-oﬀ in the respective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 - X pence
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you
have invested in addition to your initial endowment and your pay-oﬀ in the re-
spective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 + 2.5X pence
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the
uniformly distributed interval [0, 3] and on your type. There are three possible types:
type 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type, which remains
ﬁxed for all 9 rounds.
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1]
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2]
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3]
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After all teams have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of
the random number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round,
about your round payoﬀ and your accumulated payoﬀ in the whole experiment. For
your ﬁnal earnings, we will add up your payoﬀs in all 9 rounds. Please note that each
single member of a team will be paid the full earnings, which, of course, are identical
for all team members.
Prior to making your decision, you have 3 minutes to talk to your fellow team members
in a low voice. You are allowed to discuss any aspect of the experiment, as long as you
do not make any threats, insults or use otherwise oﬀensive language. Please do not
speak loudly or communicate with other teams. Anybody found in breach of these rule
will be dismissed without payment.
Treatment GRP-CHAT
At the start of this experiment, you will be randomly matched with two other individ-
uals in the room to form a team of three. Team members will remain anonymous âĂŞ
no-one will ﬁnd out who their fellow team members are during or after the experiment.
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round your team will receive an endow-
ment of 100 pence (1 pound). Your team must decide which part of this endowment
(between 0 pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will
be denoted as amount X. Within your team, you have to agree on a single choice of the
amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your
pay-oﬀ in the respective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 - X pence
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you
have invested in addition to your initial endowment and your pay-oﬀ in the re-
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spective round is Pay-oﬀ = 100 + 2.5X pence
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the
uniformly distributed interval [0, 3] and on your type. There are three possible types:
type 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type, which remains
ﬁxed for all 9 rounds.
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1]
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2]
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3]
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment
and it will be independently drawn anew in each consecutive round. After all teams
have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of the random
number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round, about your
round payoﬀ and your accumulated payoﬀs up to and including that round. For your
ﬁnal earnings, we will add up your payoﬀs in all 9 rounds. Please note that each single
member of a team will be paid the full earnings, which, of course, are identical for all
team members.
Within your team, you and the other members have to agree on the amount X in each
round. In order to reach agreement, you can communicate with the two other subjects
via an electronic chat which will appear on your computer screen. If you have agreed on
an amount X, please enter the amount on your input screen and conﬁrm your entry. If
the three members of your team do not enter the same amount X then all team members
will earn zero in this round.
It is forbidden to send any message that might reveal your identity to the other team
members. If you violate this rule you will not receive any payment.
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Appendix B: Experimental software screenshots
Figure 4.2: Treatment GRP and IND decision screen
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Figure 4.3: Treatment GRP-CHAT chat and decision screen
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Chapter 5
Testing for group polarisation in
decisions under risk
5.1 Introduction
How do people arrive at radically diﬀerent points of view on an issue when they have,
at least in theory, access to the same information? Psychological research since the
1960s has sought to explain radical opinions and decisions by theories of group pro-
cesses. One of the most inﬂuential of these is group polarisation theory (Moscovici &
Zavalloni, 1969), which holds that group discussion will bias group members’ opinions
in the direction of their pre-discussion average opinion. One of the mechanisms through
which polarisation can take place is information aggregation: each group member in-
dividually possesses a piece of information that leads to a slight bias in one direction,
and when these pieces of information are combined in a group discussion the bias be-
comes stronger. For example, a discussion between investors with a slightly positive
average personal track record of stock market investments might lead to a strong col-
lective agreement that active investment in the stock market is a proﬁtable enterprise.
This information-based perspective on group polarisation is called persuasive arguments
theory, and was ﬁrst advanced by Vinokur & Burstein (1974) in response to a body of
experimental evidence suggesting that group polarisation is driven by information ex-
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change instead of social factors (Kogan & Wallach, 1967; Teger et al., 1970; Lamm,
1967).
Recent theoretical contributions in economics show that group polarisation due to infor-
mation exchange can be explained by rational Bayesian updating (Glaeser & Sunstein,
2009; Sobel, 2012; Roux & Sobel, 2012). Group polarisation as such is thus no evi-
dence of subject irrationality, but rather a natural outcome of information aggregation
in groups. We aim to complement these predictions with an experimental test of group
polarisation in terms of risk-taking. In a typical economics experiment with choices
under risk, we investigate whether group polarisation occurs as a result of information
sharing in groups of three subjects. Information is controlled for by giving subjects
private signals on an earnings-relevant state of the world, and subjects are given the
opportunity to share these signals in a group. Polarisation is measured in diﬀerent ways,
to account for the lack of an obvious neutral reference point with respect to subjects’
risk attitudes.
We ﬁnd that group polarisation of risk-taking occurs in 30% of groups. Of the groups in
which group members receive mixed signals, 18% polarise; when all group members re-
ceive identical private signals, 50% of groups polarise. These results suggest that group
polarisation is not a universal feature of group decisions under risk. For the groups
with identical private signals, Bayesian updating suggests that polarisation should oc-
cur, and it is surprising that only half of these groups shows polarisation. The low
rate of group polarisation does not seem to be caused by poor information aggregation,
however. None of our subjects misreports their private signal to fellow group members,
and very few subjects take actions that go against the information contained in the
private signals they receive. By comparing decisions in groups with a random dictator
decision rule to individual decisions with the same information, we ﬁnd evidence that
many subjects consciously coordinate their level of risk-taking with fellow group mem-
bers when their decision may aﬀect fellow group members’ earnings. Furthermore, in
keeping with other results in the literature, group decisions have a spill-over eﬀect on
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subsequent individual decisions.
5.2 Related literature
5.2.1 Choice shifts and group polarisation
Experimental psychologists have long recognised the eﬀect of social context on indi-
vidual decisions. In one of the ﬁrst experimental demonstrations of social inﬂuence,
Allport (1924) reported that the presence of others signiﬁcantly inﬂuences individuals’
reported opinions and task performance. The famous conformity experiments of Asch
(1956) showed that subjects’ judgements can be inﬂuenced by others even if an objec-
tive criterion shows that the inﬂuencers are wrong. These and other seminal studies of
behaviour in social contexts (see Sherif, 1935; Lewin, 1947; Festinger, 1954) have shaped
the ﬁeld of social psychology, which concerns itself with how “the thought, feeling and
behaviour of individuals are inﬂuenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of
others” (Allport, 1985).
A hypothetical choice experiment by Stoner (1961) provides evidence that social context
also aﬀects behaviour under risk. Furthermore, the results from the experiment suggest
that this inﬂuence takes the form of increased risk seeking. In the experiment, subjects
have to advise a hypothetical protagonist in a risky choice scenario. Subjects make
individual recommendations ﬁrst, then make a group recommendation after a discus-
sion with other subjects. Stoner found that groups’ judgements of the acceptable level
of risk were signiﬁcantly higher than those of group members choosing as individuals,
a phenomenon since called the risky shift. The risky shift was replicated by various
authors (see Myers, 1982; Isenberg, 1986, for a review) but others found that in some
situations the group shifts to caution rather than risk (Nordhoy, 1962; Stoner, 1968).
As a result, the literature has since adopted the more general term choice shifts.
The co-existence of choice shifts to risk and caution presented researchers with a the-
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oretical challenge. One of the most prominent candidate explanations is the group
polarisation theory of Moscovici & Zavalloni (1969), which was subsequently extended
by other scholars. According to the persuasive arguments explanation of group polar-
isation (Vinokur & Burstein, 1974), the group acts as a forum in which people share
information in the form of arguments and opinions exchanged during discussion. The
processing of this information by the group leads to the ampliﬁcation of the average
group members’ attitude, away from a neutral reference point to a more extreme po-
sition. In the case of risk seeking, the theory predicts that combining a collection of
individuals that is slightly risk seeking will lead to a group that is more risk seeking
than the average of its individual members.
5.2.2 Information aggregation
If group polarisation occurs due to the exchange of information, information has to be
aggregated eﬃciently. In other words, subjects must be willing to share relevant infor-
mation with fellow group members, who in turn must believe this information. That
these assumptions are not always warranted, is demonstrated in theoretical contribu-
tions by Austen-Smith & Banks (1996) and Feddersen & Pesendorfer (1998). These
two papers demonstrate that, in some group decision settings, group members have an
incentive to strategically vote against their private information. These challenges to ef-
ﬁcient information aggregation are not just a theoretical objection. Recent experiments
on jury decision making (Guarnaschelli et al., 2000; Ali et al., 2008) present evidence of
strategic voting as predicted by the theoretical literature. Other experimental designs
have also shown that subjects often mis-report information to others when they have a
ﬁnancial incentive to do so (Cain et al., 2005; Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens & Kartik, 2009).
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5.2.3 Group risk taking and social preferences over risk
The last two stages of the experiment see subjects make two decisions under risk based
on the same probabilistic information: once in a group (random dictator decision rule1)
and once individually. A comparison of decisions in these two stages thus measures the
eﬀect of having to make a decision that also aﬀects others. Although our main focus is
on how strong group polarisation is under each of these conditions, it is worth noting
that these stages bear a close resemblance to the nascent experimental literature on
group decisions under risk. This literature aims to characterise group decisions by con-
trasting them with individual decisions, testing for systematic diﬀerences between the
two conditions. The evidence on individual and group risk-taking in these experiments
is mixed. Groups may take more (Zhang & Casari, 2010), less (Masclet et al., 2009) or
as much risk (Deck et al., 2010) as individuals, with little robust evidence as to why
these diﬀerences may or may not emerge in a particular experiment.
An interesting empirical pattern, especially in the context of measuring group polari-
sation, is that groups in some experiments seem to be more sensitive to probabilistic
information than individuals. Experimental studies by Baker et al. (2008) and Shupp &
Williams (2008) report that groups take more risk than individuals for lotteries with a
high probability of winning, and less risk for lotteries with a low probability of winning.
The experiment by Baker et al. also presents another ﬁnding relevant to our experi-
ment: individual decisions in the ﬁnal stage of the experiment are strongly correlated
with the group decision that precedes it.
1The random dictator decision rule has each of the three group members submitting an individual
decision, with one of the three decisions randomly selected to determine the earnings of all group
members. Under this decision rule, subjects without social preferences over risk have an incentive to
submit their own preferred decision. But some subjects might display social risk preferences, given
that their decision in stage III does not only aﬀect their own earnings but also their fellow group
members’ earnings.
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Table 5.1: Lottery choice table
Option S = 1 (win) S = −1 (loss) EV(p=1/9) EV(p=1/3) EV(p=1/2) EV(p=2/3) EV(p=8/9)
#1 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10 £10
#2 £12.80 £9 £9.42 £10.27 £10.90 £11.53 £12.38
#3 £15.40 £8 £8.82 £10.47 £11.70 £12.93 £14.58
#4 £17.80 £7 £8.20 £10.60 £12.40 £14.20 £16.60
#5 £19.60 £6 £7.51 £10.53 £12.80 £15.07 £18.09
#6 £20.80 £5 £6.76 £10.27 £12.90 £15.53 £19.04
#7 £21.60 £4 £5.96 £9.87 £12.80 £15.73 £19.64
#8 £22.40 £3 £5.16 £9.47 £12.70 £15.93 £20.24
#9 £22.80 £2 £4.31 £8.93 £12.40 £15.87 £20.49
#10 £23.20 £1 £3.47 £8.40 £12.10 £15.80 £20.73
#11 £23.60 £0 £2.62 £7.88 £11.80 £15.73 £20.98
Subjects’ lottery choice table for all stages of the experiment. For each lottery, column 2 and
3 show the subject’s pay-oﬀ for either realisation of the state of the world variable S. Columns 4-8
show the expected value of each option under diﬀerent probabilities that the positive state of the
world S = 1 obtains. Subjects only saw columns 1-3 during the experiment.
5.3 The experiment
5.3.1 Experimental design
We measure risk-taking by individuals through four stages of an experiment, in which
subjects accumulate probabilistic information on the realisation of a set of lotteries over
monetary earnings. In each stage, a subject chooses one of the eleven options listed in
table 5.3.1: a certain pay-oﬀ of £10, or one of ten binary lotteries with increasing levels
of return and risk. The win/lose realisation of each lottery depends on a state of the
world variable S ∈ {−1, 1}. The second column of table 5.3.1 indicates the earnings
from a particular lottery if the subject wins the lottery (S = 1 or the positive state);
the third column indicates the earnings from the lottery if the subject loses (S = −1
or the negative state). The state of the world is determined at the beginning of the
experiment and its value is valid for all stages, subjects and lotteries.
Let probability p be the likelihood of the positive state of the world with value S = 1 (a
lottery win). In stage I, subjects only know that one of the two states of the world has
been selected with equal probability (p = 1/2). Before stage II, each subject privately
receives an i.i.d. signal s that is equal to the actual state of the world S with probability
2
3
. After receiving a private signal, a rational Bayesian subject will update her belief in
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the positive state of the world in the following way:
p (S = 1|s = 1) = p (S = −1|s = −1) =
2
3
p (S = 1|s = −1) = p (S = −1|s = 1) =
1
3
Thus, if the private signal is positive (s = 1) the probability p(S = 1) increases to 2/3;
if the private signal is negative (s = −1) the probability p(S = 1) decreases to 1/3.
Although approximately one in every three subjects will receive a signal that does not
correspond to the actual state of the world, the average subject is better informed in
stage II than in stage I.
In stage III, subjects can use an electronic chat on their screen to communicate freely
with two other subjects. Groups of three subjects are randomly formed at the start of
the experiment, and thus we control for group polarisation due to subjects with similar
risk preferences being grouped together. Random allocation of subjects to groups also
means that group composition does not depend on received signals or the subjects’
decisions during the experiment. During the electronic chat, subjects can share their
individual signals with others in the group. In stage III, then, the average subject is
even better informed than in stage II. Assuming that a group eﬃciently aggregates all
information (all group members report their signals truthfully), Bayes’ rule gives the
following probabilities for the states of the world in a group with members A, B and C:
p (S = 1|sA = 1, sB = 1, sC = 1) =
8
9
p (S = 1|sA = −1, sB = 1, sC = 1) =
2
3
p (S = 1|sA = −1, sB = −1, sC = 1) =
1
3
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p (S = 1|sA = −1, sB = −1, sC = −1) =
1
9
It should be noted that these probabilities are independent of the order of the signals
in the signal proﬁle sA, sB, sC .
To avoid strategic reporting of information, we opt for group decisions by random dic-
tatorship (Myerson, 1984). Under random dictatorship, each subject submits a decision
for the group and one of these decisions is implemented with equal probability. This
rule allows subjects to deviate as much, or as little, from their individual preference
as they want. But even under this decision rule, there is no guarantee that subjects
will honestly report their private information to others. For example, an extremely risk
seeking subject might refrain from sharing information that would limit his fellow group
members’ desire for risk. We can use the chat logs from the electronic chat between
subjects to ﬁnd out if subjects misreport their signals to fellow group members during
the experiment.
In stage IV, subjects make an individual decision, as in stages I and II. Since the state
of the world S is valid for all stages, individual subjects can make use of the informa-
tion contained in the signals received in the previous stages. Because decisions in stage
IV only apply to the individual subject, comparing this decision to that in stage III
indicates the diﬀerence between a subject’s decision that only applies to herself, and
a decisions that aﬀects fellow group members as well. Under the assumption of no
learning and no order eﬀects, we interpret this diﬀerence as a measure of the impact
of pay-oﬀ commonality. In related experimental settings, pay-oﬀ commonality in small
groups has been shown to aﬀect the aggregate level of risk-taking (Sutter, 2009), or
intensify subjects’ responses to extreme probabilities (Shupp & Williams, 2008; Baker
et al., 2008).
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5.3.2 Measuring polarisation
Moscovici & Zavalloni (1969) claim that “group consensus seems to induce (...) a change
of attitudes in which subjects are likely to adopt a more extreme position” (Moscovici
& Zavalloni, 1969, p. 130). Measuring polarisation thus inevitably starts with the selec-
tion of a neutral point with respect to which the extremity of subjects’ attitudes can be
measured. Most researchers (including Moscovici & Zavalloni) have solved this problem
by measuring attitudes on a scale with a zero score as neutral reference point in the
middle. Although this approach works for hypothetically measured attitudes, in which
subjects can self-calibrate with respect to the subjective neutral reference point, it is
not feasible for incentivised decisions under risk. The reason is that there is no neutral
reference point for risk attitudes that would apply to all subjects. The middle option
in our choice set (#6) coincides with the risk neutral choice in stage I and thus seems a
logical starting point, but this ignores the fact that the typical subject in experiments
with monetary rewards is usually risk averse (Holt & Laury, 2002) and thus the pre-
deliberation bias will be negative for the majority of subjects. Experimental procedures
to induce risk neutrality in subjects have met with controversy and we choose to steer
clear of them (Selten et al., 1999).
We solve the problem of measuring polarisation by controlling for information, starting
with taking ‘zero information’ measurements of individual risk-taking in the ﬁrst stage
of the experiment. In subsequent stages of the experiment, we control for the earnings-
relevant information that subjects receive. This approach is inspired by a theoretical
treatment of group polarisation by Sobel (2012), who demonstrates how polarisation
can arise as a result of rational aggregation of private information held by individual
members of a group. We thus proceed under the assumptions that (i) subjects recog-
nise that all task-relevant information is contained in the signals they receive during the
experiment, (ii) subjects’ utility functions are monotonic and (iii) subjects understand
that the probability of the good state of the world is increasing in the signal balance
(the number of good signals received minus the number of bad signals received).
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We thus use the decisions of subjects in stage I as a subjective neutral reference point.
This neutral point controls for subjects’ individual risk attitudes, provided that the
measure of polarisation used is the diﬀerence between individual decisions in stages II
and IV (instead of decisions in stage III, which may be aﬀected by social preferences
over risk). We thus deﬁne risk polarisation at the individual level as the number of
subjects whose change in risk-taking from stage II to IV is in the same direction as the
change from stage I to II. Depending on the information contained in individual signal
s and the group’s signal proﬁle, polarisation at the individual level can be in line with
subjects’ information sets, or not. For example, it would be considered irrational for
an individual subject to choose a riskier option compared to the previous individual
decision if the information received since then has objectively decreased the probability
p of a lottery win.
Deﬁning risk polarisation at the group level is more diﬃcult. If we consider the £10
sure pay-oﬀ at the top of table 5.3.1 as the subject’s endowment in the experiment, we
can view the options further down the table as representing a percentage of their en-
dowment invested in an increasingly risky lottery. The mean value of a group’s choices,
then, expresses the average percentage of the endowment invested in the lottery by the
group members. This average, measured in stages I, II and III, is our ﬁrst measure of
polarisation at the group level. This deﬁnition of polarisation comprises many complex
patterns of behaviour. Consider a group in which all members invest 50% in stage I.
In stage II, member 1 invests 45%, member 2 invests 50% and member 3 invests 60%.
In stage IV, member 1 invests 65%, member 2 invests 50% and member 3 invests 45%.
The individual behaviours of these group members do not conﬁrm to the common con-
ception of polarisation - rather, they are a combination of idiosyncratic shifts without a
common direction. But, according to our deﬁnition of polarisation as a group behaviour
measured at the mean of group choices, the group has polarised. A second point worth
noting is that there is no value in making normative judgements about the response of
the group average choice to a combination of signals, unless all subjects receive iden-
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tical signals and should therefore update their beliefs in the same direction. We will
therefore not deﬁne any behaviour at the group level as irrational - such behaviour is
better assessed at the individual level.
As a second measure of polarisation at the group level, we follow the recommendation
of some authors and take the median choice of the three subjects.2 Again, stage I is
the neutral point, stage II is the pre-deliberation measurement and stage IV the post-
deliberation measurement. As in the case of mean group choice, deﬁning polarisation
by median group choice comprises many complex patterns of behaviour, and will not
be used to judge subject’s rationality in responding to probabilistic information. The
advantage of using the median instead of the mean in a group of three subjects is that
it is not sensitive to a single outlier - it is not possible for one group member to act as
the ’polariser’ of the whole group.
5.3.3 Procedure
All experimental sessions were carried out at the CeDEx computer laboratory at the
University of Nottingham (Nottingham, UK). We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to re-
cruit our subjects. Our 84 subjects were (mostly undergraduate) students from various
disciplines, who had previously registered for participation in economic experiments.
Average subject earnings were £11.35, and the average session time was 40 minutes.
The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) version 3.3.8.
At the start of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned a seat in the labo-
ratory. First, subjects were read instructions by the experimenter, explaining the two
states of the world and their representation by two sets of three playing cards. The
positive state of the world (S = 1) was represented by two black cards and one red card
(referred to as set A); the negative state (S = −1) was represented by two red cards and
2As Abelson (1973) argues quite convincingly, using the median rather than the mean is a more robust
measure of choice shifts, as the median is not aﬀected by skewness in the distribution of individual
preferred options.
93
one black card (set B).3 Both card sets where shown to the subjects and subsequently
put in identical card packs. The card packs where put in an opaque bag, after which
a volunteer subject blindly selected one of them from the bag. The selected pack was
put on a shelf in a prominent position in the room and subjects were told its contents
would be revealed at the end of the experiment.
In stage I, subjects were asked to pick one of the eleven options listed in table 5.3.1.
Next, before stage II commenced, subjects were informed they would receive a single
card draw with replacement (referred to as a clue) from the selected card pack that
represented the state of the world. This draw was their private signal. An assistant
experimenter visited each subject’s cubicle, asked them to pick one card from the set
and input its colour on the computer screen (black being s = 1 or the positive signal,
red being s = −1 or the negative signal). The assistant experimenter then shuﬄed
the card set before the next subject drew a card. During the signal draws, the main
experimenter oversaw the room to ensure that subjects would only observe their own
private signal. After all subjects had drawn their signal, subjects made a choice from
the same eleven options in the pay-oﬀ table.
Stage III started with an explanation of the group setting, the rules of the on-screen
chat and the random dictator mechanism. After the subjects had been given the op-
portunity to ask questions, they entered a computer chat session of 5 minutes. Subjects
were identiﬁed as subject #1, subject #2 and subject #3 in the chat box, and they
could communicate by entering free-form text messages on their keyboard. After the
chat stage, subjects were presented with the decision screen similar to the previous
stages, with the added reminder that one of the group members’ decisions would be
chosen at random to apply to the whole group. When all the subjects had submitted
their decision, one of the decisions was chosen at random by the experimental software.
The ﬁnal computer screen of this stage showed subjects (i) the decisions that each of
3All the playing cards in sets A and B were aces of either hearts or clubs; this was common knowledge
among the subjects.
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the group members had made and (ii) which one of these would be implemented as a
group decision.
Finally, stage IV presented the subjects with another choice from the 11 options in ta-
ble 5.3.1. Although subjects could use the information they received from fellow group
members in the previous stage, their decision in stage IV applied only to themselves.
After stage IV, the experimenter publicly revealed the selected stage for pay-out and
the state of the world. At the end of the experiment, all subjects completed a short
questionnaire with demographic data and questions about the experiment.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Private signals
Of our 84 subjects, 39 receive signals under state of the world S = 1 and 45 subjects
under S = −1. Under the null hypothesis of unbiased signals with Pr(s = S) = 2/3, the
expected signal frequencies are 13/26 for S = −1 and 30/15 for S = 1. The observed
frequencies in our experiment are 11/28 and 33/12, and we cannot reject the null of
unbiased signals for either state (Chi square goodness of ﬁt test, both p > 0.1).
First, we look at how subjects respond to the private signals they receive. Of the sub-
jects that receive the positive signal (s = 1), 4 out of 40 decrease their investment in
stage II relative to stage I; of the subjects that receive the negative signal (s = −1),
only 1 subject out of 44 increases her investment in stage II relative to stage I. If we
assume that subjects choose according to true, stable risk preferences and understand
that s = 1 (s = −1) signals a greater (smaller) chance of winning the lottery, these ﬁve
subjects can be said to have acted irrationally. What is more likely, however, is that
these subjects were simply trying to correct for an uncharacteristic level of risk-taking
in stage I.4 Furthermore, the majority of the 84 subjects either adjust their risk-taking
4It is plausible that these ﬁve subjects thought they had taken too much risk in stage I and wanted
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in stage II in the direction suggested by their private signal (45 subjects) or do not
change their risk-taking from stage I to stage II (34 subjects). There is therefore no
convincing evidence of irrational behaviour or misunderstandings of the relationship
between private signals and the state of the world in the ﬁrst stages of the experiment.
5.4.2 Information aggregation
We ﬁnd no evidence of subjects misreporting their signal values. Apart from a single
group, who seem to collectively misunderstand the informational value of pooling sig-
nals and are therefore excluded from subsequent data analysis, all subjects report their
signals truthfully in the group chat.5 For the remaining 27 groups, signal proﬁles were
distributed as follows: 5 uniformly positive groups, 8 mixed positive groups (two posi-
tive and one negative signals), 9 mixed negative groups (one positive and two negative
signals) and 6 uniformly negative groups.
A second component of eﬃcient information aggregation is that subjects trust the sig-
nals they receive from others. Trust in reported signals cannot be measured directly,
but we can check for actions of subjects that contradict the signals they receive in the
group chat. For example, if a subject learns that her fellow group members received
two positive signals and she believes this to be true, she should revise the probability
of winning the lottery upwards and increase (or keep constant) risk-taking relative to
stage II. We ﬁnd some evidence of subjects going against their group members’ signals.
Out of the 20 subjects whose two fellow group members receive positive signals, 3 sub-
jects take less risk in stage IV; out of the 27 subjects whose two fellow group members
receive negative signals, 3 subjects increase their risk-taking in stage IV. Although the
to correct for this by choosing a safer option in stage II. After all, there is no practice round before
subjects make their ﬁrst decision in stage I. Supporting this conjecture is the fact that all 4 ’irrational’
subjects took more risk than the average subject in stage I. The same reasoning could apply to the
subject with a negative private signal who went against her signal by increasing her risk-taking from
option 0 in stage I (below the stage average) to option 1 in stage II.
5In the group chat, one member of the excluded group claims that there is “no point discussing what
clues we got because we all could have picked the same card” and the others agree. The group proceeds
to discuss their decision without considering the signals.
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majority of subjects responded to the signals by altering their risk-taking in the direc-
tion predicted by the information content of the signals (29 out of 47) or by keeping
risk-taking constant (12 out of 47), a small part of the subjects acts in a way at odds
with eﬃcient information aggregation in their group.
Perhaps a lack of information aggregation will manifest itself in more subtle ways than
subjects explicitly going against signals reported by others. We therefore check if, for
a given group signal vector, subjects put more weight on their own signal than others.
For example, if subjects in a mixed positive signal group (two positive and one negative
signal) took more risk in stage IV when their own signal is positive rather than negative,
this suggests that subjects put more weight on their own signal. It turns out, however,
that there is no statistical evidence of such behaviour. We cannot reject the null of
an equal distribution of stage IV choices for diﬀerent private signals, both for mixed
positive signal groups and mixed negative signal groups (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U
tests, both p > 0.1).
5.4.3 Polarisation
First, we look at subjects whose risk-taking gets more extreme throughout the three
individual choice stages (stages I, II and IV) of the experiment. In total, there are 6
subjects who take more risk in each subsequent individual stage (positive polarisers)
and 7 subjects who take less risk in each subsequent individual stage (negative po-
larisers). Of the positive polarisers, 5 subjects are in groups with uniformly positive
private signals and 1 subject has a positive private signal and is in a group with a
mixed positive signal proﬁle. Of the negative polarisers, 4 subjects are in groups with
uniformly negative private signals, 2 subjects have negative private signals and are in
groups with a mixed negative signal proﬁle, and 1 subject is one of the subjects identi-
ﬁed earlier as decreasing risk-taking after learning about two positive signals from his
fellow group members. Out of the 13 polarising individuals, then, only one subject’s
polarisation is at odds with the information received from others in the group discussion.
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Next, we consider polarisation at the group level using the group mean choice as the
measure of group choice. Note that we still use choices from stage IV to measure the
shift in risk-taking after stage II.6 Out of the 27 groups in the sample, there are 5 groups
that polarise in the negative, risk averse direction, and 3 groups that polarise in the
positive, risk seeking direction. Most of these groups have uniformly positive (2 out
of 3 groups) or uniformly negative (3 out of 5 groups) private member signals. If the
group median choice is used to measure polarisation, we ﬁnd even less polarisation: 3
positively polarising group and 3 negatively polarising groups.
Of the 4 (6) groups with uniformly positive (negative) signal vectors, 2 (3) groups po-
larise, according to the more generous deﬁnition of group polarisation by group mean
choice. This is exactly 50% of the groups with uniform signal proﬁles in the experiment.
This ﬁgure is quite low, given that each subject in these groups ﬁrst receives a private
signal that should lead them to update their beliefs in favour of a particular state of the
world, then receives even stronger evidence in favour of said state of the world in the
form of two more identical signals from fellow group members. Why does the average
group shift of choices between stages I-II and II-IV not conﬁrm to polarisation? Of
the 5 groups that did not polarise, some group averages fail to shift in the predicted
direction after receiving the private signals in stage II, and other group averages fail to
shift in the predicted direction after the information aggregation in stage III and IV.
When we look at these averages in more detail, we ﬁnd that the lack of polarisation
is driven by inertia in 1 group (none of the subjects change their choice between stage
I and II) and driven by an erratic choice of a single group member in the 4 other groups.
6The results reported in this section remain unchanged if we use choices from stage III. This is due to
the high similarity between stage III and stage IV choices, which is discussed in the section on group
eﬀects.
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5.4.4 Group effects
Finally, we consider whether decisions made under the random dictator mechanism in
stage III are diﬀerent from individual decisions in stage IV. Subjects submit an individ-
ual choice in both stages but in stage III their choice, if randomly selected, will apply
to two other group members as well. First, we note that the results on individual and
group polarisation reported in the previous section are virtually unchanged when, in-
stead of stage IV, stage III is used to measure post-deliberation choice. The only change
in the previously reported numbers is the number of negatively polarising groups if po-
larisation is measured by group average (up to 6 from 5).
About half of the subjects (43 out of 81) submit the same choice in stages III and IV.
This could be explained by subjects simply submitting their individual preference as
their input for the random dictator mechanism, without considering the preferences of
the other group members. But selﬁshness does not fully explain this behaviour, as 25 of
these 43 subjects submit the exact same choice in stage III as their fellow group mem-
bers. It seems that many subjects care about other group members’ preferences, and
use the electronic chat in stage III to coordinate choices and thereby resolve any uncer-
tainty stemming from the random dictator mechanism. In all, 17 out of 27 groups agree
on a consensus decision in stage III. The high degree of similarity of choices between
stages III and IV thus indicates that choices under risk in the group context spill over
into the subsequent individual choice. These spill-over eﬀects are in line with ﬁndings
in within-subjects experiments on decisions under risk (Baker et al., 2008).
Figure 5.1 shows the average choice (as expressed as a percentage of the £10 endow-
ment) in stages III and IV, grouped by group signal proﬁle (uniformly negative, mixed
negative, mixed positive, uniformly positive). For groups with mixed signals, an in-
teresting pattern emerges: investment in stage III is more extreme, in the direction of
the probability indicated by the signal vector, than in stage IV. For groups with all
negative signals, average investment is identical (8.9% in both stages). For groups with
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Figure 5.1: Stage III and IV choices averaged by group signal proﬁle, measured as
a percentage of endowment invested. Uniformly negative groups are groups in which
members only receive negative (s = −1) signals; Uniformly positive groups are groups
in which members only receive positive (s = 1) signals. Mixed negative groups are
groups with two negative and one positive signals; mixed positive groups are groups
with two positive and one negative signals.
all positive signals, average investment is slightly higher in stage IV (55.8%) than in
stage III (54.2%). None of the per signal proﬁle diﬀerences between stages III and IV
are statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, all p > 0.1).
5.5 Discussion and conclusion
We present an experimental test of the prediction of group polarisation in incentivised
decisions under risk, by controlling for the information received by the subjects. Con-
trary to the predictions, we ﬁnd that many groups in our experiment do not polarise.
The rate of polarisation is 50% for groups in which all subjects receive the same infor-
mation; a low ﬁgure given that subjects in these groups receive increasingly stronger
information on the probability of a lottery win or loss. The lack of group polarisation is
mostly due to an erratic choice by a single group member. It is surprising that an erratic
choice by a single group member can prevent group polarisation, when the information
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sets of all group members greatly favour polarisation. It is hard to pin-point the exact
cause of this inﬂuence, although the fact that many subjects do not change their risk-
taking very much is likely to have increased the inﬂuence of outliers on the mean choice
in a group. The vast majority of choices in all stages were in the 0-50% range (options
#1 to #6 in the choice table), even for groups that received three positive signals (2 out
of 3 choices in stage IV). Perhaps an experimental design that leads subject to respond
more uniformly and stronger to changes in the probability of winning would have lead
to more group polarisation.
It could be that randomly allocating subjects to groups and trying to induce changes in
risk preferences with signals is too artiﬁcial a context for group polarisation. It could
be that the reported ubiquity of polarisation in the real world is largely due to self-
selection into groups: people are not looking for groups to exchange information in, but
for groups of like-minded individuals. The rational, information-based explanation of
group polarisation does not capture such psychological motivations, and perhaps this
is why its predictions perform so poorly in our experiment. To test this alternative
explanation of group polarisation, an experimenter could seek to allocate subjects to
groups based on their risk preferences, instead of randomly allocating them to groups.
Self-selection into like-minded groups seems a promising avenue for future research on
the social determinants of risk-taking. Another explanation of the lack of group polari-
sation in our experiment is that group polarisation is more prevalent in opinions about
risky decisions than risky decisions themselves.
A striking result in our data is the high number of groups that reach a consensus in
the group decisions with random dictatorship. Since this decision rule gives purely self-
ish subjects an incentive to submit their own preferred option, it seems plausible that
the majority of our subjects has risk preferences that are either (i) easily inﬂuenced
by other group members or (ii) comprised of an individual and a social component, in
that subjects care about risk borne by others as a result of their decision. Another
explanation is that subjects do not like probabilistic risk (the lottery) compounded by
101
social risk (who will be the random dictator, i.e. whose choice will be implemented) and
are eager to coordinate with others to remove one of these sources of risk. Very little
experimental work has been done on the origins of, and conditions for, the emergence
of group consensus on decisions under risk. Recent work on committee voting (Guar-
naschelli et al., 2000; Ali et al., 2008) is a promising starting point.
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions
Before stage I: Welcome to our experimental study of decision making. The experi-
ment will take about 45 minutes. The instructions for the experiment are simple, and
if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. The money
you earn will be paid to you, privately and in cash, immediately after the experiment.
You are not allowed to talk to other subjects during the experiment, and you are not
allowed to look at any computer screen but your own; anyone who is found breaking
these rules will be dismissed without payment.
The experiment consists of four stages. In each of the four stages, we will ask you to
submit a decision. Your earnings will depend on your decision in only ONE of the four
stages; the decisions in the other three stages will not aﬀect your earnings. The stage
that will count for your earnings will now be randomly determined by the experimenter.
We have four playing cards: the ace, 2, 3 and 4 of spades - these represent the four
stages of the experiment. [Experimenter shows cards to subjects.] We will shuﬄe them
and one will be picked at random. The selected card will go back in the box and will
remain here until the end of the experiment. [Randomly chosen subject blindly picks
playing card in front of other subjects.] You will not know which one of the stages
will count until the end. You should therefore consider your decision carefully in every
stage, since, as far as you can tell, any stage could be the one that counts for your
earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the experiment. An
experimenter will then come to you and privately answer your question.
Your earnings from the experiment depend on your decisions, and which of two card
sets is randomly selected by the experimenter. The two sets are pictured on the white-
board. As you can see, set A contains 2 red cards and 1 black card; set B contains
2 black cards and 1 red card. The experimenter will now select the set of cards; this
selection will be relevant to all four stages of the experiment. The experimenter will
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not announce the selected card set to anyone until the end of the experiment. [Show
card sets to subjects.] We will now put each of them in a box, and put these boxes in a
bag. We will now shuﬄe them, and pick one of the sets at random. [Randomly chosen
subject blindly picks box with card set in front of other subjects.]
Stage I: You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earnings
will depend on your choice and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You
make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button.
You will have 5 minutes to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been
selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you are about to make.
Please raise your hand if you have a question.
Before stage II: Before continuing to stage 2, each person will privately receive a clue
about which card set has been selected. We will do this by letting you draw a card from
the selected set, allowing you to see if its red or black, then putting it back in the set
before the next person draws a card. Your clue is private in the sense that only you
observe it. Other subjects cannot see the card you draw. Please note that we will ask
you to input your clue on the computer screen immediately after your draw.
We will now go around and give each of you your private clue. Please keep your eyes
in your own cubicle and wait until the experimenter comes to you, draw a card from
the set, look at it, then input it on your screen. You are not allowed to observe other
people’s clues.
Stage II: You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your earn-
ings will depend on your choice and whether card set A or card set B has been selected.
You make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ but-
ton. You will have 5 minutes to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if this stage has
been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you are about to
make. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
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Stage III: In this stage you will be randomly matched with two other subjects to form
a group of three. Before you make any decision, you will get 5 minutes to communicate
with your fellow group members through a chat box on your screen. You are free to
discuss any aspect of the experiment that you wish, as long as you follow these rules:
• You must not reveal any personal information (for example, your name, contact
details or seat in the room)
• You must not make any threats, insults or use otherwise oﬀensive language
If you violate these rules your payment will be forfeited.
After the chat you must choose one of the 11 options from the table below (which will
be displayed on your screen during the chat). One of the three decisions in your group
will be randomly selected and all group members will be paid according to this decision.
This means that each member of your group will earn the same amount. At the end of
this stage, you will be informed of each group member’s decision and which one of the
three group members’ decisions has been selected.
You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. The earnings of each
member of your group will depend on which of the three group members’ choices will
be selected and whether card set A or card set B has been selected. You make a choice
by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit decision’ button. You will have 5
minutes to make a decision. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
Note: One of the group members’ choices will be randomly selected and implemented
for the entire group. Keep in mind that, if this stage has been selected for pay-out, you
will be paid according to the selected decision.
Stage IV: In this part of the experiment, you must make another decision, this time
individually. You must choose one of the 11 options in the table shown below. Your
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earnings will depend on your choice and whether card set A or card set B has been
selected. You make a choice by selecting a single option and pressing the ’Submit
decision’ button. You will have 5 minutes to make a decision. Keep in mind that, if
this stage has been selected for pay-out, you will be paid according to the decision you
are about to make. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
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Appendix B: Experimental software screenshots
Figure 5.2: Stage I decision screen
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.Figure 5.3: The private signal input screen before stage II
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Figure 5.4: Stage II decision screen
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Figure 5.5: Stage III group chat screen
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Figure 5.6: Stage III decision screen
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Figure 5.7: Stage IV decision screen
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis contributes to the literature on group decision making under risk with three
novel experiments and a literature review that combines a previously unlinked body
of cross-disciplinary evidence. The results presented in the preceding chapters thus in-
crease our understanding of how groups make decisions under risk from the perspective
of the experimental economist, with risk-taking measured over real incentives in a con-
trolled setting, without ignoring the ﬁeld’s strong ties to the psychology literature.
The three experiments shed light on the role of group communication, group compo-
sition and information sharing for risk-taking by groups. In chapter three, we present
evidence of peer eﬀects on risk-taking after subjects consult with each other, although
these peer eﬀects are of a diﬀerent nature than the choices made by groups. These
results suggest that diﬀerent types of peer inﬂuence may exist between subjects in the
same experimental design, and that pay-oﬀ commonality between group members is an
important part of what deﬁnes a group’s decision.
In chapter four, we show that international diversity of group members does not aﬀect
risk-taking by groups in an abstract investment task, and we suggest various reasons
why this ﬁnding is at odds with the existing theoretical literature and small body of
empirical results on team diversity. We also ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of gender composition:
groups with more females are more risk averse. The gender composition eﬀect appears
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to be driven by the interaction of group discussion with an underlying demographic
eﬀect on risk preferences, as it is equally strong in a treatment with discussion by on-
screen computer chat.
In chapter ﬁve, we test the theoretical prediction that group polarisation arises after
subjects receive private information and share this information with fellow group mem-
bers. Rates of polarisation are low - only half of the the groups strongly predicted to
display polarisation actually polarise - and the lack of polarisation is mainly due to
idiosyncratic decisions by a single group member. The group discussion stage of the
experiment has a big eﬀect on decisions - many subjects display social preferences over
risk by co-ordinating their choices under a random dictator group decision rule with
fellow group members. Furthermore, group stage decisions have a strong eﬀect on sub-
sequent individual decisions, in line with other results from the experimental literature
reviewed in chapter two.
Group decision making under risk has been an active ﬁeld of research in recent years,
and we think it will continue to oﬀer exciting opportunities for future research. In the
concluding remarks of chapter two, we propose that researchers go beyond comparisons
between individuals and groups, and suggest that group institutions and group com-
position are two important variables that merit further investigation. With an eye on
practical applications, we think that ﬁeld research can be especially valuable. Another
opportunity for further research lies in the design of theories of group decision making
in accord with the experimental ﬁndings we have reviewed and presented.
Finally, we note that the experimental studies in this thesis could be extended in various
ways. The process of ‘consultation’ introduced in chapter two has many diﬀerent imple-
mentations - an obvious manipulation would be incentivise subjects to give each other
proﬁtable advice, thereby introducing a measure of pay-oﬀ commonality. Another inter-
pretation of consultation is professional advice, in which the consultant is not a peer of
the consultee, but a supposedly independent party paid to provide expert advice. Some
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work has already been done on this topic, with a focus on ﬁnancial advice. Second, the
experiment on group composition in chapter three could be repeated in other settings.
One possibility is more context-heavy or complex settings, in which eﬃcient communi-
cation is key to understanding the risks involved; it is possible that certain degrees of
diversity or unfamiliarity between group members would aﬀect risk-taking in such set-
tings. An alternative interpretation of our results on group composition is that students
educated at internationally focused universities have better cross-cultural communica-
tion skills than older generations - this is an hypothesis that can be tested. Third, more
work can be done on the importance of the group polarisation phenomenon in decisions
under risk. Our results suggest that extreme risk-taking or caution in groups is not
widespread, even when Bayesian updating suggests it should be. Perhaps endogenous
group formation or a more context-heavy setting would bring out more polarisation in
groups. Alternatively, we do not exclude the possibility that group polarisation is more
prevalent in opinions about risky decisions than risky decisions themselves.
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